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[The] question of guilty clients . . . is the oldest of the old, old questions for
lawyers. 1
I. INTRODUCTION
Basic morality teaches that if a person injures another, he should
take responsibility for what he has done. Lawyers, by contrast, typi-
cally assist injurers in the reverse-denial. Legal culture masks the
immoral as the normal. "You prove it," says the defendant's lawyer,
"and if you cannot, then my client will not pay." How did lawyers
grow so comfortable in assisting injurers in a basic act of moral regres-
sion? Can this be changed?
In a prior essay, I addressed denial from the perspective of the cli-
ent.2 There I argued that, possible economic benefits notwithstand-
ing, failing to take responsibility poses serious spiritual and
psychological risks to injurers. Here I focus on the role of the lawyer.
My goals are twofold. The first is to examine critically the practice of
lawyers assisting clients in denying harms they commit and suggest
some ways of changing that practice. 3 Lawyers commonly presume
that their clients' interests are best served by denial. Yet such a pre-
sumption is not warranted. Given the moral, psychological, rela-
tional, and sometimes even economic risks of denial to the injurer,
lawyers should consider discussing responsibility taking more often
with clients. The second is to explore several structural or systemic
1. Thomas L. Shaffer, Should a Christian Lawyer Serve the Guilty?, 23 GA. L. REV.
1021, 1023 (1989).
2. Jonathan R. Cohen, The Immorality of Denial, 79 TUL. L. REV. 903 (2005) [herein-
after Immorality].
3. Though I will not address it here, the obverse problem of lawyers assisting clients
in bringing unwarranted accusations also merits serious consideration.
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factors that may reinforce the practice of denial seen day in and day
out within our legal system.
Part II ("Clients and Lawyers") begins by critiquing lawyers who
unreflectingly cater to, and sometimes even help create, clients' imme-
diate desires for denial. As mentioned, the common presumption that
a client's interests are best served by denial is highly questionable.
Even if a lawyer anticipates that denial will benefit a client finan-
cially, a lawyer should not assume that such expected economic bene-
fit outweighs possible moral, psychological, and relational costs to the
client. Hence, under the existing professional ethics norms, lawyers
should consider counseling clients about responsibility taking far
more often than they do. The failure of lawyers to offer such counsel-
ing does not rest upon the strictures of legal ethics codes. Observe,
however, that denial usually works to the lawyer's economic benefit
through escalating the conflict and lengthening litigation.
For the lawyer who decides to discuss responsibility taking with a
client, the question of how to do so requires careful consideration. Ob-
stacles to such counseling include client reticence to disclose mistakes,
the lawyer's fear of appearing judgmental or disloyal, and expecta-
tions by both lawyers and clients that the lawyer's essential role is to
minimize the client's financial liability. ("Your job is to get me off. If I
wanted someone to tell me to take responsibility for what I have done,
I would have gone to a minister or psychologist.") Such obstacles,
however, are not insurmountable, and can often be met with good cli-
ent counseling. Critical to such counseling is a strong lawyer-client
relationship based upon trust. Further, great rewards may await cli-
ents and lawyers who discuss responsibility taking. Responsibility
taking after injuries can help clients maintain morally-grounded lives,
and the lawyer who discusses that path with clients may discover a
deepened sense of purpose in her work. 4
Part III ("Some Structural Factors") shifts from the specific, "mi-
croscopic" lawyer-client interaction to the broader, "macroscopic" con-
text within which the microscopic practice of denial occurs. How has
the immoral path of denying rather than taking responsibility after
injury become normalized within our legal system? How do lawyers
become so comfortable being complicit in it? Such questions undoubt-
edly raise many other questions. Here I address several structural
factors interwoven with the microscopic practice of denial. These are
economic incentives in litigation, dispute resolution mechanisms, legal
education, and aspects of our broader cultural composition including
rights-based ideology and social denials of structural injustices. For
each topic I consider whether and how such a factor may reinforce the
4. Throughout this Article, for literary convenience, I use masculine terms to de-
scribe the client and feminine terms to describe the lawyer. No gender implica-
tions are intended.
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practice of denial we see in ordinary disputes. I do not suggest that
these factors alone explain our culture of legal denial. For example, as
will be discussed in Part II, individualistic factors such as greed and
shame avoidance by clients undoubtedly prompt much denial. Fur-
ther, structural factors not discussed here (e.g., social mobility and an-
onymity among citizens, religious beliefs concerning atonement and
forgiveness of sin, etc.) may also buttress the practice of denial we see
in ordinary legal disputes. I select these four factors as they are
closely tied to our legal system. Please note that I do not attempt an
exhaustive treatment of any of these topics. Each topic is vast.
Rather, my aim is exploratory-to suggest a few basic questions and
hypotheses for future research.
Regarding economic incentives, I present a basic economic model
illustrating that, under our compensatory damages system, denial is
.often the logical choice for injurers with primarily pecuniary motiva-
tions. If we wish to discourage denial, we ought to think seriously
about the greater use of incentives, such as damage multipliers, to
make denial economically costly. Regarding dispute resolution mech-
anisms, I argue that, when channeling cases into different dispute res-
olution mechanisms, we should consider that different mechanisms
are likely to generate different levels of responsibility taking. For ex-
ample, mediation, which creates direct encounters between parties, is
more likely to foster responsibility taking than litigation, which keeps
the parties separated.
Law schools provide a rich training ground for subsequent complic-
ity in denial by teaching students to seek victory for their clients re-
gardless of the merits. Critical to this education is the pedagogy of
repeatedly emphasizing technical argumentation over feelings or
moral sensibilities. As the extrinsic motivation of victory supplants
the intrinsic motivation of seeking justice among law students, the
seeds of both the public's lack of respect for the legal system and the
severe levels of psychological distress found among lawyers are also
sown. Further, law schools do a very poor job of teaching students
about helping future clients handle their mistakes. In "Socratic"
classrooms where the basic attitude toward errors is "not to make one"
lest one be publically shamed before one's fellow students, students
become ill-equipped to squarely address and discuss human error,
both their own and, by extension, those of future clients.
Rights-based ideology, prevalent not only within law schools but
within society generally, forms another piece of the denial picture.
Within our culture, people, especially lawyers, commonly focus on in-
dividuals' rights and overlook individuals' responsibilities. Denial is
almost always within an injurer's legal rights, but deeply at odds with
his responsibilities. Social denial of structural injustices (e.g., regard-
ing conquest and racism) is another aspect of our cultural composition
[Vol. 84:247
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worth examining. Are there links between such "macroscopic" denials
and the "microscopic" denials in ordinary law suits? A denial mindset
of disregarding morality for profit's sake is common to both settings,
as is a lawyer readily adopting the mentality of obedience to a sys-
tem's rules to rationalize complicity with immoral acts.
Several introductory notes may be of use. First, for reasons I de-
scribe in greater detail elsewhere, my focus here is upon civil rather
than criminal cases.5 The criminal setting raises enough distinct is-
sues (e.g., the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination,
power disparities between the state and the accused, etc.) so as to
merit separate treatment. Second, with minor exception, I will not
address the influence of liability insurance on the injurer's denial.
Though I will comment on it at points, an in-depth treatment of this
significant subject is also beyond the scope of this Article. Third, the
discussion below works both within and outside what is commonly
called the "zealous advocacy" framework. 6 Part II's critique of law-
yers assisting clients in denying harms they have caused, as well as
the suggestion that lawyers consider discussing responsibility taking
with clients, falls squarely within the zealous advocacy framework.
Properly understood, existing legal ethics standards often require
such consideration. Part III, by contrast, raises questions of a struc-
5. See Immorality, supra note 2, at 905-06. For fine presentations in criminal law
raising related concerns, see Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Crime, Confession, and the
Counselor-at-Law: Lessons from Dostoyevsky, 35 Hous. L. REV. 327 (1998)
(speaking on the risk of psychological guilt to the guilty-in-fact criminal defen-
dant who denies his guilt at law); Stephen P. Garvey, Punishment as Atonement,
46 UCLA L. REV. 1801 (1999) (commenting on the possibility of atonement
through criminal punishment); see also JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND
REINTEGRATION (1989) (remarking on the role of shame in reintegrating criminals
into society).
6. In recent years, attempts have been made to "soften" the level of zeal with which
lawyers are to pursue their work. Compare, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPON-
SIBILITY CANON 7 (1983) ("A lawyer should represent a client zealously within the
bounds of the law."), with MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2003) ("A
lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence ... in representing a client."). How-
ever, the Comment to Rule 1.3 does provide, 'A lawyer must.., act with commit-
ment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon
the client's behalf." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. (2003). Such
change notwithstanding, the grip of the 'zealous advocacy" paradigm on the
minds of lawyers is quite strong. See, e.g., Monroe H. Freedman & Abbe Smith,
Zealous Representation: The Pervasive Ethic, in UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETH-
ics 71 (2004) ("This ethic of zeal ... established in Abraham Lincoln's day ...
continues today to be 'the fundamental principle of the law of lawyering' and 'the
dominant standard for lawyerly excellence.'") (citations omitted); see also Leo-
nard L. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 43-48 (1982)
(describing the adversarial paradigm as lawyers' 'standard philosophical map").
On the historical development of the zealous advocacy framework, see Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239 (1991); Freedman &
Smith, supra.
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tural nature. While parts of the discussion hol1 implicit criticisms of
the zealous advocacy framework, my goal here is not to criticize that
framework per se, but rather to examine factors buttressing the prac-
tice of denial within that framework. 7 Most of this discussion is
neither for nor against the zealous advocacy framework but largely
outside of it.
The argument presented here is at its root a simple one flowing
from the premise that it is immoral to deny responsibility for an injury
one has committed. Some readers may find the picture painted too
simple or "reductionist" and feel that the critique of denial has been
pushed too far. My goal here is to identify and explore what I consider
a largely unrecognized aspect of legal practice-a missing "piece of the
puzzle." I do not mean to suggest that this missing piece forms the
whole puzzle. Yet before a synthesis can be achieved between what is
recognized and what is largely unrecognized, the unrecognized must
first be recognized.
The eighteenth century founder of Hasidic Judaism, known as the
Baal Shem Tov, once claimed that,
The chiefjoy of the Satan... is when he succeeds in persuading a man that an
evil deed is a mitzvah [a deed commanded by God]. For when a man is weak
and commits an offense, knowing it to be a sin, he is likely to repent of it. But
when he believes it to be a good deed, does it stand to reason that he will
repent of performing a mitzvah?s
7. The zealous advocacy framework has received much scholarly attention by both
supporters and critics. For some of the finest defenses of that framework, see
MONROE FREEDMAN, LAwYERs' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1975) (defending
zealous advocacy on systemic grounds); Charles P. Curtis, The Ethics of Advo-
cacy, 4 STAN. L. REV. 3 (1951) (emphasizing the combative, game-like quality of
litigation); Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, a
Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613 (defending zeal-
ous advocacy based on client autonomy). There are many fine critiques as well.
See, e.g., THE GOOD LAWYER (David Luban ed., 1983); ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE
LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993) (envisioning law-
yers as "lawyer-statesmen" who embody "prudence" and "practical wisdom");
DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988) (attacking role
ethics justifications of zealous advocacy) [hereinafter ETHICAL STUDY]; DEBORAH
L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION
(2000) (writing on the need for considering legal ethics within institutional con-
text); WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAwYERS' ETH-
ICS (1998) (suggesting that lawyers should act in ways that promote "justice" or
the "legal merits" of the case); RICHARD ZITRIN & CAROL M. LANGFORD, THE
MORAL COMPASS OF THE AMERICAN LAWYER (1999) (decrying adversarial ex-
cesses); Thomas L. Shaffer, The Unique, Novel, and Unsound Adversary Ethic, 41
VAND. L. REV. 697 (1988) (employing a historical critique of zealous advocacy,
paying particular respect to communitarian rationales). For a summary of this
ethical debate over the past three decades, see David Luban, Reason and Passion
in Legal Ethics, 51 STAN. L. REV. 873, 877-80 (1999).
8. Louis I. Newman, The Baal Shem Tov, in CREATORS OF THE JEWISH EXPERIENCE
IN ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL TIMES 287, 302 (Simon Noveck ed., 1985).
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Our legal system masks the vice of denial after injury as a virtue. We
have developed a culture of legal denial. To fix this problem, we must
first understand it.
II. CLIENTS AND LAWYERS
A. Client Ethics
Before addressing the topic of denial, it is helpful to take a step
back to understand the broader ethical domain within which that
topic resides. When discussing ethics, lawyers almost always focus on
professional ethics. As the name suggests, professional ethics concern
the professional. Professional ethics address, for example, what ethi-
cal obligations a lawyer has to the client, to the court, and to third
parties. Codes of professional ethics, such as the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct ("Model Rules") and the ABA Model Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility ("Model Code"), are paradigmatic of this focus.
In the language of philosophers, these codes address role ethics, that
is, the ethical obligations entailed when acting in a certain profes-
sional role.
In contrast, the root ethical issue raised by denial falls into a dif-
ferent, and sadly often overlooked, domain. One might call this the
domain of disputant ethics, client ethics or, perhaps most basically,
interpersonal ethics.9 Consider questions like, "Are there times when
taking revenge is morally acceptable?" or, "If a person apologizes for
injuring me, must I forgive him?" These questions had ethical rele-
vance long before mechanisms such as courts or professional lawyers
existed. In legal conflict, lawyers are ultimately the secondary
figures. They are the agents of the parties. The domain of disputant
ethics addresses the ethics of the parties themselves. It explores how
people should treat one another after injury or when in conflict.
Within it we find matters such as apology and forgiveness, respect and
revenge, and responsibility and relationships. The focus is on the eth-
ics of the parties, not the ethics of the lawyers.
B. Responsibility Taking as the Moral Response to Injury
A foundational question within the realm of disputant ethics is,
"What should a person do who injures another?" The answer is so
simple that even children know it. The ethical response to injuring
another is to take responsibility for what one has done. Usually one
should begin by apologizing. Next one should try to make amends, for
example, by offering fair compensation to the injured party. Ideally
9. For further discussion, see Jonathan R. Cohen, A Taxonomy of Dispute Resolu-
tion Ethics, in HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION (Robert Bordone & Michael
Moffitt eds., forthcoming 2005).
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the injurer and the injured will have a direct dialogue through which a
remedial plan acceptable to both is established.' 0 In short, the injurer
should actively take responsibility for what he has done. Conflict is
not the inevitable result of injury. Where an injurer fails to take re-
sponsibility after an injury, conflict is quite likely. Conversely, the
ethical path of active responsibility taking by the injurer usually re-
sults in relational repair and speedy private settlement. The injurer's
choice of whether to take responsibility voluntarily is often simultane-
ously a choice of whether cooperation or conflict will ensue.
The response where the injurer denies responsibility is, by con-
trast, an act of moral regression. It compounds the primary injury
with a secondary one. Even if the injured party can prevail at trial-
and often the injured party cannot, either from lack of evidence or
from the skill of the injurer's lawyers-such compensation will be
delayed and usually reduced by the cost of the injured's legal fees,
commonly one-third for a contingency case. Further, in terms of the
injurer's morality, passive accountability enforced by a court is not an
ethical substitute for voluntary, internally-chosen responsibility tak-
ing.'1 The former, though certainly necessary where an injurer fails
to take responsibility, can hardly be called ethical behavior by the in-
jurer at all, while the latter reflects the true internalization of ethical
norms. Note too that the injurer who fails to take responsibility puts
himself at serious psychological risk.12 The guilt of not making
amends, even if not consciously recognized, can be haunting. Also of
note is what one might call relational risk.13 Many injuries occur in
the context of prior relationships (e.g., family, business, neighbor, etc.)
and until the injurer makes amends it can be impossible for those re-
lationships to go forward. Finally, many also see failing to take re-
sponsibility as placing the injurer at spiritual risk. For example, both
Christian and Jewish scriptures advise injurers to first make amends
with injured parties before seeking Divine forgiveness. 14
10. There are, of course, circumstances where direct dialogue may be inappropriate,
even with a mediator present. See, e.g., Lisa G. Lerman, Mediation of Wife Abuse
Cases: The Adverse Impact of Informal Dispute Resolution on Women, 7 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 57 (1983) (arguing mediation is inappropriate where domestic vio-
lence exists).
11. See Immorality, supra note 2, at 920-23.
12. See id. at 933-37.
13. See id. at 922.
14. In Judaism, see, for example, MISHNAH YoMA 8: 9 ("For transgressions against
God, the Day of Atonement atones, but for transgressions against another human
being, the Day of Atonement does not atone until one has made peace with that
person."). In Christianity, see, for example, Matthew 5: 23-24 ("Therefore if thou
bring thy gift to the altar, and there rememberest that thy brother hath ought
against thee; Leave there thy gift before the altar, and go thy way; first be recon-
ciled to thy brother, and then come and offer thy gift."). For further discussion,
see Immorality, supra note 2, at 929-32.
[Vol. 84:247
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If the ethical response of taking responsibility for injury is so clear,
and if failing to follow that response poses significant moral, psycho-
logical, relational, and perhaps even spiritual risks to injurers, then
why do so many injurers fail to take responsibility? Later I explore
the contribution of our legal system and legal culture to that practice,
but first let us recognize two factors internal to the injurers them-
selves: greed and shame. 15 Despite knowing that responsibility tak-
ing is the ethical response to injury, many injurers place money before
morality. They fear, sometimes rightly and sometimes wrongly, that
responsibility taking will be more costly economically than denial,
and, consciously or not, overlook their moral obligation for financial
reasons. For example, an injurer with solely pecuniary motivations
may see denial largely as a no-lose gamble. "If the denial succeeds, I
will pay nothing, but if the denial fails I will just have to pay what I
would if I took responsibility directly. So why shouldn't I deny?"16
Yet greed is not the only motivation for denial. Indeed, it may not
even be the primary one. Sociopaths aside, most people who commit
injuries experience guilt for what they have done, whether consciously
or subconsciously. That guilt can readily translate itself into a feeling
of internal shame.17 To take responsibility is to face one's shame
squarely-to bring it out in the open. Yet, like the child who lies when
caught with his hand in the cookie jar, many injurers unreflectingly
choose to deny. Though such does not provide a basis for moral ex-
cuse, their denials and other avoidances reflect a shame-avoidant my-
opia, the belief that they can avoid facing the shame of their error
altogether if only they can avoid facing it now.18 As Mark Twain's
Huckleberry Finn put it, "That's just the way: a person does a low-
down thing, and then he don't want to take no consequences of it.
Thinks as long as he can hide it, it ain't no disgrace."19 Sadly such
responses usually escalate the conflict and ultimately compound the
injurer's sense of shame.
Though it is possible to raise some (largely unsatisfactory, in my
view) moral defenses to the approach of denial after injury (e.g., based
upon the possibility of generating fairer ultimate settlement out-
15. See Immorality, supra note 2, at 938 (discussing greed), 940 (discussing shame
avoidance).
16. For further discussion, see infra section III.A.
17. See Immorality, supra note 2, at 935.
18. See id. at 940.
19. See 8 THE WORKS OF MARK TWAIN: ADVENTURES OF HUCKLEBERRY FiNN 268
(Victor Fischer et al. eds., 2003). Though Huckleberry Finn is an American clas-
sic, it is also a very problematic work. See SHARON RUSH, NEVER THE TWAIN
SHALL MEET: HUCKLEBERRY FiNN AND THE COLOR LINE (forthcoming 2004) (argu-
ing teaching Huckleberry Finn creates emotional segregation among Black and
non-Black children).
2005]
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comes), I will not explore these here. 20 Let me mention, however, two
serious and related issues: ambiguity and prematurity. Some may as-
sert that questions of fault, both moral and legal, are typically com-
plex and ambiguous. They may argue that for a person unilaterally to
take responsibility prior to full legal proceedings is premature. "Fault
is only known after a court has passed its judgment, not before." Else-
where, I respond to this argument at greater length, but let me make
a few basic points here. 2 1 First, in many instances of injury, fault, in
both moral and legal senses, is quite clear to one such as an injurer
who knows the facts. 22 We should not let the complexity of some cases
lead us into believing that fault is always ambiguous. To assert that a
person who injures another should never take responsibility absent
full legal proceedings is simply untenable. Many injurers quite
rightly assume responsibility of their own initiative day in and day
out. Second, where fault is ambiguous, say because of factual or legal
ambiguity, possible "injurers" should not take responsibility on their
own, but, generally speaking, await a court's determination. Third,
where parties know they are at fault in one area but unsure of the
extent of their fault in another area, they should at least take respon-
sibility for the former area. Finally, though a party may not initially
be sufficiently aware of facts to properly accept responsibility, when
an injury or claim of injury occurs, the putative injurer has some duty
of investigation to determine what occurred and should take responsi-
bility, if appropriate, after such ambiguities are resolved.
C. The Typical Pattern of Denial
In contrast to the moral path of active responsibility taking, law-
yers commonly lead injurers in the opposite direction: responsibility
avoidance. Key to this path are both silence and denial. 2 3
Suppose a client who has injured another enters a lawyer's office.
What is likely to happen? Soon into the conversation, the client will
share his story with the lawyer. The client's account may or may not
20. See Immorality, supra note 2, at section IV.B.
21. See id. at subsection IV.B.3.
22. Legal and moral fault can of course differ. For example, in American legal ethics
discourse, there is a debate dating back to David Hoffman's 19th-century re-
marks on whether a lawyer should assert a statute of limitations defense to an
otherwise just debt. See DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 754 (2d ed.
1972) (1836).
23. Twenty-five years ago, William Felstiner et al. famously described the injured
party's steps toward litigation as "naming, blaming, and claiming." See William
Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blam-
ing, Claiming... , 15 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 631 (1980-81). By way of parallel, the
injurer's steps toward litigation might be described as "injuring, avoiding, and
denying." Perhaps empirical research will someday be conducted on this latter
topic assessing the frequency at which each stage is reached akin to Felstiner et
al.'s earlier research.
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include an admission of fault, but it probably will indicate that the
injured party has filed or is likely to file a claim. If she has not done so
already, usually the lawyer will instruct the client to cease communi-
cating with the other party. "It is best to let me do the talking. Any-
thing you say to the other side can be used against you in court. You
can talk with me, and you can talk with your spouse if you want, for
those conversations are protected by legal privileges. By the way, be
careful even when speaking with friends. They can be subpoenaed
and made to testify to your conversations."
The message that injurers should refrain from communicating
about the case and only speak, if at all, after the lawyer grants per-
mission is so well known that many clients internalize it before they
see their lawyer. As a sheriff who was removed from office for public
drunkenness said to the press in explaining his refusal to comment on
his case, "I'm seeing an attorney (today), and as soon as he tells me
[what] I need to say, then I can talk to you." 2 4 A similar theme is
found in instructions sent by some insurance companies to their in-
sured motorists instructing them not to apologize if they are in an ac-
cident. 25 Perhaps most basically the public learns this lesson through
the celebrated Miranda warnings in the criminal context: "You have
the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used
against you in a court of law. You have the right to be speak to an
attorney, and to have an attorney present during any questioning."26
The lesson is simple: statements made to the other side could be used
against you in court, so remain silent and let your lawyer do the
talking.
If the lawyer does start speaking for the client, that pattern of si-
lence is likely to continue, if not grow into outright denial. Should the
lawyer speak with the other party, it is extremely unlikely that she
will admit her client's fault. An exception helps prove the rule here.
In 1987, the Veterans Affair Medical Center in Lexington, Kentucky
("Lexington VA") switched from the widespread "deny and defend" ap-
proach of responding to medical errors27 to an approach of responsibil-
24. Karen Voyles, Lafayette Sheriff Is Relieved from Duty, GAINESVILLE SUN, Aug. 22,
2002, at Al.
25. See Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1009,
1012-13 n.9 (1999) [hereinafter Advising Clients].
26. There is no single form to the Miranda warnings mandated by constitutional law.
The quotation above is among the most common and simple language.
27. See Rachel Zimmerman, Doctors'New Tool to Fight Lawsuits: Saying "I'm Sorry',
WALL ST. J., May 18, 2004, at Al (describing "deny and defend" as the traditional
approach to responding to medical errors); see also Marianne D. Mattera, Memo
From the Editor: Better to Beg Forgiveness?, MED. ECON., June 4, 2004, at 5
("[lit's long been a tenet of liability insurers that you never admit a mistake or
apologize for a mishap, lest it come back to bite you in court.").
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ity taking.28 This involved admitting fault, apologizing, and offering
fair compensation. 29 Although the responsibility-taking approach to
medical error has since grown markedly3O-in part because this moral
response has proved financially viable3 i-when the Lexington VA im-
plemented that approach, most lawyers who learned of it were highly
skeptical. As hospital attorney Ginny Hamm stated, "The attorneys
around here in Lexington [thought] we were crazy."32 The moral re-
sponse to injury is commonly viewed by the legal community as
bizarre.
And how will the lawyer respond if the other side files a complaint?
Typically the response will be denial, or at least the denial of every-
thing that arguably can be denied.33 The lawyer will admit to facts
both inconsequential and indisputable. Matters of consequence, how-
ever, are likely to be disputed. Notwithstanding that (a) modern fed-
eral civil pleading practice takes a liberal attitude toward discovery 34
and permits a general denial only where the defendant "intends in
good faith to controvert all the averments" of the plaintiff's com-
plaint,3 5 (b) Rule 36 provides that a party's denial in response to a
request for admission must "fairly meet the substance of the re-
quested admission,"3 6 and (c) the unwarranted denial of a factual con-
tention is an explicitly enumerated basis for Rule 11 sanctions,3 7 the
reality in practice still has a strong residue of general denials and de-
mands of strict proof. As attorney Dmitry Feofanov writes:
Every lawyer (including myself) has been told by his or her mentors that the
"right way" to respond to certain allegations in a complaint is as follows: if the
complaint alleges that a document says so-and-so, respond, "the document
speaks for itself." If the complaint alleges that venue is proper, respond, "calls
28. Jonathan R. Cohen, Apology and Organizations: Exploring an Example from
Medical Practice, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1447, 1451 (2000) [hereinafter Apology
and Organizations].
29. Id. at 1452-53.
30. See Zimmerman, supra note 27 (discussing the growth of apology in medical prac-
tice); Jonathan R. Cohen, Toward Candor after Medical Error: The First Apology
Law, 5 HARv. HEALTH POL. REV. 21 (2004) (discussing the rise of new laws to
exclude medical apologies from admissibility into evidence) [hereinafter Toward
Candor].
31. See Apology and Organizations, supra note 28, at 1453-54; Zimmerman, supra
note 27.
32. Apology and Organizations, supra note 28, at 1449 (emphasis added) (quoting
Lexington VA attorney Ginny Hamm, who served both as the hospital's counsel
and as a member of its risk management committee).
33. A similar approach holds in depositions, where witnesses are coached to say no
more than they must.
34. See FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(1) ("Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter,
not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party ... .
35. FED. R. CIv. P. 8(b).
36. FED. R. Civ. P. 36(a).
37. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(4).
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for legal conclusion." Add, "to the extent there remain any factual allegations,
they are denied." If an allegation cannot be denied, ask for "strict proof."
3 8
The bench too is aware of the pervasiveness of denial. For example,
"[aifter years of unsuccessful efforts to correct a gaggle of fundamental
pleading errors [i.e., different forms of denial] that continue to crop up
in responsive pleadings," Senior United States District Judge Milton
Shadur issued what was in essence a cautionary opinion to the Bar at
large, listing, analyzing, and warning against the use of the most com-
mon forms of pleading evasion in his jurisdiction. 3 9
Why do lawyers do this? The strategic rationale may be summa-
rized in one word-caution. 40 "We can always admit something later,
but if we admit it now, there is no going back. Let's take some time to
see what develops and be sure we are on top of the facts." The defense
lawyer might add a further point: "If we don't deny, the rules state
that we will be taken as having admitted everything the plaintiff as-
serts.4 1 Once a complaint has been filed (and it's almost always writ-
ten in plaintiff-biased language), we cannot be neutral. Silence is not
really an option, for if we simply say nothing, that has the effect of an
admission. Despite initial appearances, the rules are actually cast in
favor of our denying."
So normalized is the denial modality that, should a settlement be
reached, even in cases where, realistically speaking, all the parties
recognize the fact of the injurer's wrongdoing, a usual term in the set-
tlement will be a disclaimer of any wrongdoing by the injurer. Coca-
Cola's recent settlement of racial discrimination claims is illustrative.
Under the settlement, the largest such settlement in U.S. history,
38. Dmitry N. Feofanov, Of Speaking Documents and Talking Clams: A Proper An-
swer Under Federal and State Rules, DCBA BRIEF ONLINE (JOURNAL OF THE
DUPAGE COUNTY BAR AsS'N) (Nov. 2002), at http://www.dcba.orgbrief/novissue/
2002/art21102.htm (last visited Aug. 5, 2005); see also David J. Luban, The Eth-
ics of Wrongful Obedience, in ETHICS IN PRACTICE: LAWYERs' ROLES, RESPONSIBIL-
ITIES, AND REGULATION 94 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2000).
Every litigation associate goes through a rite of passage: she finds a doc-
ument that seemingly lies squarely within the scope of a legitimate dis-
covery request, but her supervisor tells her to devise an argument for
excluding it. As long as the argument isn't frivolous there is nothing
improper about this, but it marks the first step onto the slippery slope.
For better or for worse, a certain kind of innocence is lost. It is the mo-
ment when withholding information despite an adversary's legitimate
request starts to feel like zealous advocacy rather than deception.
Id. at 106.
39. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Riley, 199 F.R.D. 276, 278 (N.D. Ill. 2001).
40. Observe, however, that risks attach to both admitting responsibility (e.g., one's
admission being used against one in court) and denying responsibility (e.g., rela-
tional damage from denial may lead to an escalation of hostilities).
41. See FED. R. Cv. P. 8(d) ("Effect of Failure to Deny. Averments in a pleading to
which a responsive pleading is required.., are admitted when not denied in the
responsive pleading.").
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Coca-Cola agreed to pay $156 million, but admitted no fault.42 As-
suming, arguendo, Coca-Cola actually was at least in part at fault,
what would have been so wrong if, when reaching the settlement,
Coca-Cola had admitted its fault?43 Some may contend that Coca-
Cola is unusual, that it had concerns about negative publicity and
suits by parties who did not join the settlement. But in essence it is
not. The usual civil settlement is of a no-fault form: the injurer pays
money, the injured releases the injurer from all present and future
claims, and the injurer admits no fault. But why should not the in-
jurer (verbally) acknowledge fault along with the payment? Some
claim that, "The payment is the acknowledgment of fault." Such a
statement simply reflects how socially-entrenched the pattern of de-
nial is. How strange it is that the verbal admission of fault is often
harder to extract than a payment.
Query too whether our courts should rubber-stamp such settle-
ments that are predicated on fault avoidance. On the one hand, such
settlements may foster private dispute resolution and docket clearing,
and may also avoid the efforts that might need to be expended to de-
scribe the extent of fault. On the other hand, such settlements may
have an anti-therapeutic, "band-aid" effect, helping the injurer to
patch over but never fully address the roots of the injury, thereby in-
creasing the likelihood of reinjury.44 Further, and perhaps most fun-
damentally, is the issue of the linkage between our courts and truth.
Unlike purely private settlements, many settlements to court cases
become court orders. The imprimatur of the courts is upon them. Our
courts articulate the pursuit of truth and justice as central ideals. It
seems plausible that our courts may have an interest in not lending
their name and power to settlements with significant components of
nondisclosure if not falsity.
1. Denial Reinforcement, Fault Projection, and Conflict
Escalation
The lawyer's denials are likely to produce several negative conse-
quences. Three of the most salient are reinforcing the injurer's denial,
projecting fault on the injured party, and overall conflict escalation.
42. See Greg Winter, Coca-Cola Settles Racial Bias Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2000,
at Al.
43. For further discussion and examples, see Jonathan R. Cohen, Legislating Apol-
ogy: The Pros and Cons, 70 U. CIN. L. REv. 819, 854-55 (2002).
44. For an argument against allowing criminal nolo contendere and Alford pleas in
which fault is also not admitted based on such anti-therapeutic effects, see
Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and Criminal
Procedure: The Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REV.
1361 (2003).
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The external story of denial the lawyer pens will likely serve to
reinforce any internal sense of denial the injurer may have. Parties in
conflict commonly have fairly strong, self-serving cognitive biases.4 5
Further, whether or not the story is true, by writing the story one is
led to believe it.46 Thus, the external act of legal denial may promote
an internal psychological denial by the client. The story advanced in
the written legal denial may become a piece of the mask the client
uses to prevent himself from squarely facing his acts.47 Further, in
many cases, a denial-based collusion of sorts may arise between the
client and the lawyer. "I the client want to believe a narrative pro-
claiming my innocence that you the lawyer will help write. Moreover,
I am concerned that if I tell you the truth-that I was at fault-you
will not fight for me as vigorously." "I the lawyer do not want to know
everything that you have done, for I want to write a narrative pro-
claiming your innocence, and not only may my ignorance be of strate-
gic benefit at trial,48 but it is easier for me (e.g., there is less cognitive
dissonance and value conflict for me) if I think you are innocent, or at
least do not know you are guilty."
Psychologists often speak of the linkage between denial and projec-
tion. Projection is a process of unconsciously attributing to the other
person characteristics of oneself that one denies to oneself. Like slave-
owners who saw slaves rather than themselves as "lazy," or invading
"settlers" displacing natives they saw as "nomadic," the very faults
one refuses to recognize in oneself one may project onto others.49 A
somewhat analogous process takes place in many legal disputes,
though now the denial and projection are conscious processes.
Suppose an accident has occurred through the injurer's negligence.
How is the accident to be explained? If the injurer denies that he was
45. For references, see Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological
Theory, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 163, 206 n.199 (2000).
46. See, e.g., E. Tory Higgins & William S. Rholes, "Saying Is Believing" Effects of
Message Modification on Memory and Liking for the Person Described, 14 J. Ex-
PERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 363 (1978).
47. On such legal masking of persons, see generally JOHN T. NOONAN, PERSONS AND
MASKS OF THE LAW: CARDOZO, HOLMES, JEFFERSON, AND WHYTHE AS MAKERS OF
THE MASKS (1976); Walter 0. Weyrauch, Law as Mask: Legal Ritual and Rele-
vance, 66 CAL. L. REV. 699 (1978).
48. The allusion here is that the lawyer's willful or contrived ignorance might benefit
the client by in essence helping the client or his witnesses commit perjury at trial.
See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) (2003) ("A lawyer shall
not knowingly offer evidence ... that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer,
the lawyer's client, or a witness called by the lawyer, has offered material evi-
dence and the lawyer comes to know its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable
remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal."). On such
contrived ignorance, see David Luban, The Social Responsibilities of Lawyers: A
Green Perspective, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 955, 980-81 (1995).
49. See Albert Memmi, Mythical Portrait of the Colonized, in THE COLONIZER AND
THE COLONIZED 79, 79-89 (1991).
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at fault for the accident, then he must assert that someone or some-
thing else caused the accident.50 And who is most likely to become the
target of such projection? None other than the injured party. "If I did
not cause the accident, you must have," the injurer decides.51 Perhaps
the injurer will go so far as to file a counterclaim. From the injured
party's perspective, the situation is quite remarkable: "You injure me,
and not only don't you compensate me, but you have the gall to claim
that I have injured you!"
As should be clear, the injurer's choice of whether to take or deny
responsibility strongly influences the course the dispute will take.
The injurer's response is often a crossroads or tipping point for the
subsequent encounter. 52 Accepting responsibility usually yields swift
settlement, while denying or failing to take responsibility usually pro-
duces conflict escalation. Recall that many injuries occur by accident.
The injurer had no intention of committing harm. The decision not to
take responsibility, by contrast, is usually a deliberate choice. Had
the injurer accepted responsibility, including offering compensation,
the injured party may have forgiven, at least in the sense of reducing
anger. But where the injurer denies or fails to take responsibility,
hostilities usually grow.
2. Lawyers Benefit from Conflict Escalation
Are the economics of lawyering an important driver of the practice
of denial? Unlike the plaintiff lawyer who works on a contingency fee,
most defense lawyers earn their livelihood from the process of litiga-
tion. As a litigation partner who represented corporate defendants at
a law firm where I once worked joked (I paraphrase), "Our good clients
come to us ahead of time seeking advice about how to avoid a lawsuit.
But our best clients come to us after the fact."
50. Implicit here is the binary conception of fault common within much legal think-
ing, critiqued long ago by John Coons in his call for the apportionment of respon-
sibility. See John E. Coons, Approaches to Court-Imposed Compromise-The
Uses of Doubt and Reason, 58 Nw. U. L. REV. 750 (1964). For further discussion
and references, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, From Legal Disputes to Conflict Res-
olution and Human Problem Solving: Legal Dispute Resolution in a Multidis-
ciplinary Context, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 7, 20-21 (2004). Though I will not explore it
here, I would note as well the possibility that responsibility need not be divided
solely among the parties (so their shares of responsibility sum to one), but that
richer understandings of causality that recognize the role of circumstance (e.g.,
"It was just an accident. No one was a fault.") may also be possible. For a brief
discussion, see Apology and Organizations, supra note 28, at 1462.
51. See ROBERT M. BASTRESS & JOSEPH D. HARBAUGH, INTERVIEWING, COUNSELING,
AND NEGOTIATING: SKILLS FOR EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION 280 (1990) ("A typical
problem arises from the client's inclination to blame others for the consequences
of his or her own conduct.").
52. See THoMAs C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR 99-110 (1978).
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I am not asserting that most defense lawyers consciously decide
against counseling responsibility taking at the outset of the case based
on economic self-interest. Most are aware of the professional require-
ment to put their clients' interests before their own and would not, I
suspect, consciously do otherwise. Yet the obliviousness of many de-
fense lawyers to the possibility of discussing responsibility taking with
their clients does work to the lawyer's economic benefit. Not only
might the defense lawyer's legal fees for the instant case be reduced if
it settles rapidly, but her reputation as a "tough litigator," critical for
attracting future clients, may be damaged. If one-third of an apology
had monetary value, I suspect many more plaintiffs' lawyers would
seek apologies.53 If advising responsibility taking increased a defense
lawyer's billable hours, I suspect many more would talk about that
path with clients. 5 4
3. Some Objections
Can the typical practice of failing to consider talking with injurers
about responsibility taking be defended? Usually that practice is done
automatically, so possible justifications are never offered. In a previ-
ous work, I suggested and largely rejected one possible justification-
that ultimately fairer results could occur when the injurer denies re-
sponsibility.55 Here I consider, and largely reject, several other possi-
ble responses. These are: (1) that denial is permitted if not required
by the ethics of zealous advocacy; (2) that lawyers already do discuss
responsibility taking with clients; (3) that the lawyer cannot simply
know whether the client is guilty-in-fact or innocent-in-fact, and given
that ambiguity, the safe route is to assume the latter; and (4) that if
the lawyer raises the possibility of responsibility taking with the cli-
53. See Advising Clients, supra note 25, at 1045.
54. Though I suspect counseling responsibility taking will generally work against a
defense lawyer's economic interests, countervailing factors may exist. First, the
lawyer may offset some of the billable hours she loses litigating with increased
billable hours spent in client counseling, for, as discussed below, effectively coun-
seling responsibility taking often takes some time. Second is the possibility that
the lawyer, like some collaborative lawyers, may increase her client base by de-
veloping a reputation as a wise counselor. Though fees per client may decrease,
the overall number of clients may rise.
55. See Immorality, supra note 2, at subsection IV.B.2. The claim against responsi-
bility taking runs roughly as follows. If split-the-difference forces drive settle-
ment outcomes, then an initial denial of fault by the injurer could ultimately lead
to a fairer result than an initial acceptance of fault. Note, however, that the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure provide that if an offer of settlement is made and
rejected and if"the judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not more favorable
than the offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the making of the
offer." FED. R. Civ. P. 68. This provides a strong incentive for a plaintiff who
receives a fair offer to accept it, and for the defendant who makes a fair offer to
stick to it.
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ent, the lawyer risks alienating the client. While I largely reject these
possible responses, I believe much can be learned from their
consideration.
a. The Defense of Zealous Advocacy
A first response for many lawyers is to seek refuge in the ethics of
zealous advocacy. "Who are you to suggest that I defend clients out of
personal greed, putting my interest before theirs? Did you learn noth-
ing of legal ethics? I am duty bound to be a zealous advocate for my
client. To do anything less than fighting with all my efforts on behalf
of my client would be shirking my professional duty." They might in-
voke Lord Brougham's famous call toward thick-skinned battle,56 or
may turn to the words of the adversary system's greatest modern de-
fender, Monroe Freedman:
In the adversary system, it is not the role or function of the advocate to act
upon conclusions of ultimate facts such as guilt or innocence. That function is
assigned to the judge or jury, which bases its decision on the adversaries' pres-
entation of their clients' cases. Thus, the fact of guilt or innocence is irrele-
vant to the role that has been assigned to the advocate. 5 7
The vision of the lawyer as a zealous advocate, fighting relentlessly
on behalf of her client, is a powerful one.58 The problem, however, is
in what one might call the advocacy bias in legal representation, that
is, in reducing the lawyer's entire role to that of a partisan combatant
in litigation.59 (Observe that my goal in this Article is not to enter the
56. Lord Brougham stated,
An advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the
world, and that person is his client. To save that client by all means and
expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons, and, among
them, to himself, is his first and only duty; and in performing this duty
he must not regard the alarm, the torments, the destruction which he
may bring upon others.
2 TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE 3 (James Cockroft & Co. 1874).
57. FREEDMAN, supra note 7, at 57.
58. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1983) ("A Lawyer
Should Represent a Client Zealously Within the Bounds of the Law"); EC 7-1
("The duty of a lawyer, both to his client and to the legal system, is to represent
his client zealously within the bounds of the law. .. ").
59. See generally Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of
Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. REV. 669 (1978) (arguing for differentiated legal ethics stan-
dards for different tasks); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute
Resolution: New Issues, No Answers from the Adversary Conception of Lawyers'
Responsibilities, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 407 (1997) (similar). Observe too that Lord
Brougham began his statement with the important qualification, "[an advocate,"
not "a lawyer" or "an attorney." See supra note 56. It may be helpful to recall
here the British division between solicitors, who focus significantly on legal coun-
seling, and barristers who argue in court. The American approach of merging
these two functions into a single professional, the lawyer, yields problems
(though of course some benefits too), for ethical norms (e.g., of partisanship and
zeal) perhaps appropriate for debate in court carry poorly to other areas. See
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longstanding debate about whether and how a lawyer should advocate
for guilty clients,6 0 but, roughly put, to explore how lawyers should
counsel guilty clients.61) Lawyers serve their clients not only as advo-
cates, but also as counselors. The Comment to Model Rule 1.3 articu-
lates this often overlooked distinction well: "A lawyer must also act
with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with
zeal in advocacy on the client's behalf." The lawyer's ethical duty, in
other words, is not zealous advocacy per se but acting "in a manner
consistent with the best interests of his client."6 2 Zealous advocacy is
a means or technique, but not an end. As a first approximation (for
lawyers of course have other duties as well), the client's best interests
are the general end of legal representation.
Recognizing that the lawyer should act in the best interests of the
client implicates two fundamental questions: (1) what are the client's
best interests, and (2) what technique or approach will best serve
those interests? In response to the first question, most civil defense
lawyers presume that the client's "best interests" means the client's
best financial or pecuniary interests. 63 But why should that presump-
tion be made? Do not clients have moral, psychological, relational,
and spiritual interests as well? Failing to pay compensation for an
injury one has caused can be financially beneficial, but it can be harm-
ful to the injurer in these other ways. How can the lawyer know a
priori which outweighs which? She cannot. The common practice of
automatically reducing the client's "best interests" to "best financial
interests" is in error.
A second common error is assuming that, even if a client's ends are
purely financial, the most effective strategy for pursuing them is a
combative one. Even from the pecuniary viewpoint, compromise can
sometimes be more effective than combat. The experience of the Toro
Corporation ("Toro"), a manufacturer of lawn care products, is telling.
For years, Toro responded with an aggressive "litigate everything"
infra note 161. Roughly put, this Article concerns the mistake of unreflectingly
carrying the lawyer-as-barrister's approach of denial to the role of the lawyer-as-
solicitor.
60. In American discourse, that debate begins with 19th-century Hoffman-Sharwood
dialogues. For a description and references, see THOMAS L. SHAFFER, The Prob-
lem of Representing the Guilty, in ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND LAWYER 57, 57-69
(1981). It has continued with the many modern discussions of the ethics of zeal-
ous advocacy. For references, see Immorality, supra note 2, at 907 n.11.
61. For two fine works in this vein, see THOMAS L. SHAFFER, The Problem of Ministry
to the Guilty, in ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND LAWYER, supra note 60, at 71, 71-79
(1981); Cochran, supra note 5.
62. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-9 (1983).
63. For a critique, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Specula-
tions on a Women's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L. J. 39, 57 (1985).
Similarly, most criminal defense lawyers presume "best interests" means mini-
mum time in jail.
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strategy to the roughly 125 annual personal injury claims arising from
the use of its products.6 4 In 1991, amidst (like the Lexington VA)
much skepticism from the Bar, Toro switched to a conciliatory mode of
response, seeking to mediate cases and making what it saw as fair
offers of compensation in mediation. Following this change, Toro's av-
erage total cost per claim fell from $115,620 to $30,617. By 1999, Toro
had saved over $75 million by switching from a combative to a concili-
atory approach.
b. Counseling Clients About Such Matters Already Occurs
Another response is not to fight the criticism that lawyers should
think about discussing responsibility taking with clients, but to sug-
gest that they already do. This argument may branch in one of three
directions.
A first branch stresses the strategic benefits of conceding adverse
facts at trial. Some attorneys may reason, "surely a good lawyer needs
to know the weaknesses of her client's case. It is better to present
damaging facts to the jury on direct examination than to have them
brought out on cross examination. Even if her concern is only strat-
egy, the lawyer who ignores the weaknesses of her client's case is fool-
hardy." Though I accept the innoculatory efficacy of disclosing
weaknesses at trial, a trial strategy of conceding weaknesses is very
different from a philosophy of actively accepting responsibility. As
discussed, the passive accountability a trial can produce by no means
fully substitutes for active responsibility taking. For example, if the
injured party lacks sufficient evidence to prove its burden, morality
still calls for the injurer to actively take responsibility. A rationale of
strategic concession, by contrast, would suggest the injurer remain si-
lent at trial for disclosure would be strategically disadvantageous.
A second branch of justification points to the general importance of
moral counseling in legal representation. This idea is reflected, for
example, in calls within both the Model Rules and Model Code for law-
yers to discuss moral dimensions of cases with clients.6 5 In so far as it
goes, such a view is accurate-discussing moral matters with clients is
undoubtedly a proper part of legal representation. The problem with
this justification is that, with rare exception, this particular moral
matter, which is among the most significant moral matters in legal
64. For more details about Toro, see Apology and Organizations, supra note 28, at
1460-61.
65. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2003) ("In representing a client, a
lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid ad-
vice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other consid-
erations such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be
relevant to the client's situation."); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-
8 (1983) (similar).
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representation, is usually not discussed explicitly. Further, discuss-
ing responsibility taking with clients can be quite different from dis-
cussing many other moral considerations. Consider, by contrast, a
fine example offered by Shaffer and Cochran in their classic legal eth-
ics text. They ask whether a residential property owner should raise
legal objections to a proposed zoning change that would permit a
nearby residence to be turned into a group home for developmentally
challenged men, thus possibly harming property values in the neigh-
borhood.66 There are, no doubt, important ethical considerations at
stake. Yet such a client is likely to be relatively comfortable talking
about them, for any mistakes he might make are prospective in na-
ture. The person who has injured another, by contrast, is likely to feel
ashamed about what he has already done, making a moral dialogue
with the client far more challenging.6 7
A third branch of justification suggests that lawyers already do
talk with clients about responsibility taking. Some may argue: "One
should not be overly-cynical or simplistic. Lawyers are not mindless
hired guns. They are counselors too. As counselors, they often help
clients face issues that are difficult for those clients to face. While
lawyers may not often use the term 'responsibility taking,' it is wrong
to suggest that lawyers never talk with clients about having to face
matters clients would rather avoid."
If it is true that lawyers commonly discuss or even think about dis-
cussing responsibility taking with clients, then I will happily pack up
my bags and go home. At this point in time, however, I do not think
this is the case. Like the criminal law presumption of "innocent until
proven guilty," the normal mode of civil defense is to deny. 68 (The
very word "defendant" is suggestive of this: the defendant defends
against the charge.) Lawyers who impress upon clients adverse facts
commonly do so late in the dispute, often with the goal of "softening"
their own client about the possibility of settlement. 69 Further, the
perspective underlying such conversations tends to remain that of lia-
bility minimization.
66. THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND MORAL
RESPONSIBILITY 116-34 (1994).
67. See DAVID A. BINDER & SusAN C. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING:
A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH 10-11 (1977) (identifying the client's shame about
mistake, which they label the "ego threat," as a primary barrier to full disclosure
by the client to the lawyer).
68. Some may ask whether empirical data exists showing the frequency with which
lawyers discuss responsibility taking with clients. To my knowledge, such data
does not exist. (Such counseling occurs, of course, in private lawyer-client inter-
actions.) However, from both conversations with numerous lawyers and many
anecdotal accounts (e.g., the Bar's reaction to the Lexington VA's approach), I
think it fair to say that the normal approach to civil defense is denial.
69. See infra section III.B (discussing lawyers use of mediation to indirectly break
bad news to clients).
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c. The Lawyer's Epistemological Demurrer
A third line of response focuses on the lawyer's lack of knowledge.
"When a client enters my office, he does not come with a label of 'inno-
cent' or 'guilty' attached. One only knows these things after trial, not
before. Further, even if the client does remember the facts accu-
rately-and often they do not-many, especially the 'guilty' ones, are
less than candid with me about what happened. The terminology of
'injurer' you use simply is not helpful. What I have are clients, and I
cannot know which are 'injurers' and which are not. 70 How then can I
speak with them of responsibility taking?"
Such reasoning, called by Deborah Rhode the lawyer's "'epistemo-
logical demurrer," is often offered to justify the lawyer's partisan-
ship.71 Though this excuse qua justification may be critiqued in a
variety of ways, it contains an important element of truth. In many
cases, the proposition is true that the lawyer does not know whether
her client is innocent-in-fact or guilty-in-fact.
The flaw in the argument, however, is in moving from this proposi-
tion to the conclusion that the lawyer should not discuss responsibility
taking with clients. First, often lawyers do know or can determine
with confidence the merits of their client's claims.72 Second, and more
fundamentally, a lawyer need not know with certainty whether the
client is innocent-in-fact or guilty-in-fact to consider discussing re-
sponsibility taking with the client. When it comes to responsibility
taking, the critical issue is not what the lawyer knows to be true but
rather what the client knows to be true. To use an analogy, many
great sports coaches are not themselves great athletes. Rather, what
great coaches know best is how to assist athletes. So too legal counsel-
ors do not usually know all that their clients know. Indeed, many cli-
ents, especially those who have committed injuries, are reticent. Yet
the challenge of providing legal counseling that assists the client in
making the best choices for himself still remains. Even if she does not
know with certainty that the reticent client is guilty-in-fact, a good
70. As Paul Tremblay states, "[In law offices, clients and client agents do not present
unambiguous stories of injustice, corruption, or unconscionability. Well, maybe
they do, but it is always the other side who fits that description." Robert F.
Cochran, Jr., et al., Symposium: Client Counseling and Moral Responsibility, 30
PEPP. L. REV. 591, 621 (2003).
71. See Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV.
589, 618-20 (1985).
72. Such views are common. See, e.g., FREEDMAN, supra note 7, at 53; Marvin E.
Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1031, 1039
(1975); Rhode, supra note 71, at 619. One of the leading models of ethical lawyer-
ing even rests in part on this view. See William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in
Lawyering, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1083, 1089-90 (1988) ("[T]he central thrust of the
approach defended in this essay is to insist that the [lawyer's] decision[s] should
often turn on 'the underlying merits.'"); SIMON, supra note 7, at 9.
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lawyer might help the client who does know with certainty that he is
guilty-in-fact think about the possibility of responsibility taking.
d. Client Alienation
Though in its specifics it may take numerous forms, a fourth justi-
fication of the defense lawyer's usual approach focuses on the risk of
client alienation. "Many clients come to me precisely with the expec-
tation that I will help them deny. If they wanted someone to tell them
to take responsibility, they would have gone to a minister or psycholo-
gist. If I raise responsibility taking with them, I will alienate them,
and if I alienate them, I can no longer serve them. If I raise responsi-
bility taking with them, they will see me as judgmental, paternalistic,
and maybe even disloyal. Further, who am I to substitute my moral-
ity for theirs? While it may be true that there are examples like Toro
where responsibility taking saves the client money, surely that is not
the norm. If it were the norm, many more clients would take responsi-
bility out of self-interest. The fact that clients so often choose to deny
indicates that many expect that more is to be gained than lost finan-
cially by denying.73 And if this is what the client wants-if what the
client cares about is money-who am I to second guess him? It is not
my job to be holier-than-thou and substitute my morals for the cli-
ent's. I am there to serve the client, not to judge him. That is for the
judge and jury."
In the ensuing section, I address the question of how to lessen the
risk of client alienation when discussing responsibility taking, for,
particularly if done poorly, the risk of client alienation is substantial.
Let me first respond briefly to the charge that to discuss responsibility
taking with clients is to impose the lawyer's morality upon the client.
I do not suggest that a lawyer should substitute her moral values for
her client's. The rules of legal ethics are clear, and in my view right,
that it is for the client to determine the ultimate ends of legal repre-
sentation, and that the lawyer who feels unable to abide by her client's
ends should seek to resign.7 4 Observe too that I have not argued here
73. See infra section III.A.
74. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) ("A lawyer shall abide by a
client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation. . . ."), 1.16(b)(4)
(2003) ("[A] lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if ... the client
insists upon taking action.., with which the lawyer has a fundamental disagree-
ment. . . ."). Some may ask whether the lawyer's decision to seek to resign (I
write "seek" as in adjudicatory matters withdrawal can require the leave of the
court) should be more than a matter of personal preference but rather one of
professional obligation. Suppose, for example, that after discussing responsibil-
ity taking with a client who the lawyer is convinced is at fault (e.g., because the
client has admitted his fault to the lawyer), the civil client nevertheless insists on
denial. Can the argument be made that the lawyer should be under a profes-
sional duty to withdraw (e.g., that the legal profession should not be complicit in
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(though probably such arguments can be made) from what one might
label the public or social perspective that the lawyer should discuss
responsibility taking with the client so as to produce more just out-
comes.7 5 Nor do I dispute the claim (indeed in section III.A, I argue
for the claim) that under our current legal system denial is often best
for the injurer economically. Rather my argument is that lawyers
should not assume that clients have solely economic interests. A de-
fault presumption should not be set focusing solely on the client's eco-
nomic interests and ignoring the client's possible moral, psychological,
relational, and spiritual interests. Indeed, no default presumption
should be set at all. If it is for the client and not the lawyer to deter-
mine the ultimate ends of legal representation, then the lawyer must
speak with the client and explore what those ends are. The lawyer
must learn, rather than presume, the client's interests.
The description of legal counseling within Ethical Consideration 7-
8 of the Model Code captures so well the approach envisioned here:
A lawyer should exert his best efforts to insure that decisions of his client
are made only after the client has been informed of relevant considerations. A
lawyer ought to initiate this decision-making process if the client does not do
so. Advice of a lawyer to a client need not be confined to purely legal consider-
ations. A lawyer should advise his client of the possible effect of each legal
alternative. A lawyer should bring to bear upon this decision-making process
the fullness of his experience as well as his objective viewpoint. In assisting
his client to reach a proper decision, it is often desirable for a lawyer to point
out those factors which may lead to a decision that is morally just as well as
legally permissible. He may emphasize the possibility of harsh consequences
that might result from assertion of legally permissible positions. In the final
analysis, however, the lawyer should always remember that the decision
wrongful denial) or otherwise modify her approach to legal representation? Such
an argument would be antithetical, of course, to the traditional understanding of
zealous advocacy, and such a rule, if adopted, could significantly impede law-
yer-client communication. Yet perhaps the case can be made. For related dis-
cussions, see ETHICAL STUDY, supra note 7 (arguing the pursuit of justice should
be the foundational goal of the legal profession); SIMON, supra note 7 (arguing the
pursuit of justice should be the foundational goal of the legal profession).
Observe too that for the lawyer who believes her client is at fault, how she
assists that client in denial in litigation while simultaneously complying with the
rules of procedure is far from apparent.
By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or
later advocating) a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney
... is certifying that to the best of the [attorney's] knowledge, informa-
tion, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circum-
stances ... (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein
are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the ex-
tension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of
new law; ... (4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the
evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of
information or belief.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b).
75. For such approaches to legal ethics, see, for example, Robert W. Gordon, The In-
dependence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1988); KRONMAN, supra note 7.
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whether to forego legally available objectives or methods because of non-legal
factors is ultimately for the client and not for himself. In the event that the
client in a non-adjudicatory matter insists upon a course of conduct that is
contrary to the judgment and advice of the lawyer but not prohibited by Disci-
plinary Rules, the lawyer may withdraw from the employment.7 6
When it comes to responsibility taking, the first two sentences of the
paragraph above are particularly telling. "A lawyer should exert his
best efforts to insure that decisions of his client are made only after
the client has been informed of relevant considerations. A lawyer
ought to initiate this decision-making process if the client does not do
so." For most injurers, the decision of whether to take or deny respon-
sibility is the most fundamental ethical choice they will make, or will
have made for them, during litigation. It is laced with moral, psycho-
logical, relational, and economic considerations-considerations
which can often point in different directions. If there are to be any
areas where the lawyer helps the client think seriously about the im-
plications of his decisions, surely this should be one of them.
D. Counseling Responsibility Taking
Often the lawyer either knows or suspects that her client is at fault
for what occurred. In some cases, this occurs during the initial client
interview. In other cases, the lawyer develops this sense over time
based on what the client has said, what the client has not said, or
information garnered from sources other than the client. Whatever
the source, how is the lawyer to raise the question of responsibility
taking without alienating the client?
Before answering the question, two preliminary comments to
frame the discussion may be of help. First, I mentioned earlier by way
of a hypothesized defense of denial the idea that some clients seek
lawyers precisely because they want to deny harms they commit, and
that both the lawyer and the client have the expectation that it is the
lawyer's job to help the client deny. The more this is true, then of
course the more difficult raising the question of responsibility taking
with clients will become. In my opinion, however, this characteriza-
tion is often inaccurate. Many clients come to lawyers because they
have a problem, if not a crisis, with legal dimensions, and what they
seek from their lawyers is help in handling the problem.77 Many cli-
ents do not arrive with a rigidly predetermined approach to their prob-
lem in mind. Rather they seek professional help to handle something
76. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (1983).
77. Such a conception underlies, for example, Brandeis' "lawyer for the situation," see
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAw (1978), and subsequent
views of lawyers as problem solvers. See ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND
WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES (2000); Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of
Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754 (1984).
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they cannot adequately handle on their own. Sometimes such help is
purely "technical," as when a lawyer knows the correct terminology to
use when drafting a will. Yet often the help is of a broader nature,
including not only legal advocacy but counseling and advice.
Second, in my view, the willingness of many clients to think seri-
ously about responsibility taking and discuss it with their lawyers de-
pends significantly on the lawyer's willingness to "go there." The
lawyer is the professional experienced in handling such matters, and
most clients take cues from lawyers about what to discuss and what
not to discuss. Consider by analogy what is for many among the hard-
est matters to discuss-death. In her pioneering work on caring for
the terminally ill, Elisabeth Kiibler-Ross found that whether patients
would in fact talk with their medical professionals about death-a
subject many patients wanted to discuss-depended significantly on
the willingness of the medical professionals to talk with them about
death. Where the professionals were comfortable talking about death,
patients would discuss death with them. However, where the profes-
sionals were uncomfortable talking about death, patients would not.78
A similar lesson applies to responsibility taking. The willingness of
clients to talk about responsibility taking with their lawyers may de-
pend significantly on the willingness of the lawyers to talk with them
about it.
1. Trust and Relationship, Not Magic Bullets
For many lawyers, raising the subject of responsibility taking with
clients is a "difficult" or intimidating conversation to initiate. 79 Few
enjoy being the bearer of bad news.80 The lawyer may fear that if she
raises responsibility taking, the client will grow angry with her and
view her as judgmental, paternalistic, and perhaps even disloyal. Is
there an approach to such conversations that fully avoids such risks?
No, there is no "magic bullet" for making the process of discussing re-
sponsibility taking with clients riskless and effortless.8 1 Yet not dis-
cussing the issue with the client is often inadequate too. The basic
choice of whether to take or deny responsibility should be the client's.
To know, rather than presume, what the client wants, the lawyer
must discuss it with the client. Further, the potential moral, psycho-
logical, and relational costs of failing to take responsibility are pre-
cisely the type of important considerations that a client might
78. See ELISABETH KOBLER-Ross, ON DEATH AND DYING 244-68 (1969).
79. On approaching such conversations, see generally DOUGLAS STONE ET AL., DIFFI-
CULT CoNvERsATIoNs: How TO Discuss WHAT MATTERS MOST (1999).
80. Yet often lawyers must bear "bad news" and should learn to do so skillfully. For
advice, see Linda F. Smith, Medical Paradigms for Counseling: Giving Clients
Bad News, 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 391 (1998).
81. Id. at xvii.
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overlook on his own, making the potential service to the client of rais-
ing the issue particularly valuable. Thus, from the viewpoint of client
service, there are risks both to raising and to not raising responsibility
taking with clients. Though not easy to have, if the lawyer wishes to
best serve the client, such conversations are frequently necessary.
How then should the lawyer do this? Below I offer some general
thoughts. Much, however, depends on the particular client, the partic-
ular lawyer, their particular relationship, and the particular case.
There is no simple recipe for effective communication. Effective com-
munication is highly context- and people-dependent. The general
thoughts below are no substitute for the lawyer giving careful atten-
tion to the particularities of each case.
If there is one word that captures what is needed to make such
conversations effective, it is trust. Raising the subject of responsibility
taking involves drawing attention to a mistake or mistakes the injurer
has made, which in turn may press upon the injurer's sense of shame.
How will the injurer react to having his attention so focused? If the
injurer distrusts the lawyer, he will probably react negatively. Likely
he will hear the conversation as words of accusation and rebuke, and
will grow angry at the messenger rather than facing the message. On
the other hand, if the injurer trusts the lawyer, the chances are far
greater that he will hear the words as ones of care and face the diffi-
cult matters implicated. At first, the lawyer's role may seem opposi-
tional; however, at a deeper level the injurer may experience it as
supportive. To use a rough parallel, it is easier to heed constructive
criticism from a trusted friend than from a stranger.
The first questions the lawyer should thus pose are ones to herself.
"Am I trustworthy? Have I acted toward this client in a manner such
that he trusts me?" If the answers to such questions are "no," con-
structively discussing responsibility taking will be difficult. This chal-
lenge of being trustworthy is nontrivial for many lawyers. An
important part of many lawyers' jobs is not telling the whole truth. In
litigation, for example, to best serve their clients, lawyers commonly
present half the truth.8 2 Though they may not actively lie, they often
must selectively omit and slant, with the hope of persuading the judge
or jury to accept the version of the facts most favorable to their client.
The adversarial trial system is designed this way. While being trust-
worthy in the jury's eyes is important to trial advocacy, being less
than fully candid is also an important legal skill. In certain respects,
lawyers are called upon to be fully trustworthy in some areas but not
others. This is no simple task.
82. Deception is common in legal negotiations as well. For a critique, see Gerald B.
Wetlaufer, The Ethics of Lying in Negotiations, 75 IowA L. REV. 1219 (1990).
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Related to trust is the quality of the lawyer-client relationship
generally. As mentioned, the more the client feels his lawyer cares
about him, the more receptive he is likely to be to conversations of
responsibility taking. As typified by the growth of the mega law firm,
we live in an age when legal services have in significant ways become
commodified. Lawyers jump from firm to firm and city to city. Rela-
tionships with clients are often short-lived. Constrained by the billa-
ble hour, conversations with clients are often brief. When stacks of
documents are being sifted through in discovery, it may not matter
exactly which lawyer does the sifting. But when it comes to raising
the subject of responsibility taking, it does. The lawyer-client ano-
nymity common in law practice today is antithetical to such conversa-
tions. Though I will not argue here the position that "once there was a
time" when lawyers did speak with clients about responsibility tak-
ing-both for fear of romanticizing the legal past8 3 and, more funda-
mentally, because I do not believe that sufficient data about past and
current legal counseling exist to make such a comparison-I note the
possibility that such counseling may have once occurred more than it
now does.84
Before raising the subject of responsibility taking, it is important
that the lawyer listen carefully to the client's story and demonstrate to
the client that she understands his account. Not only will this help
the client to feel that the lawyer is on his side, but it also helps en-
courage the client to listen to the lawyer. There has been much dis-
cussion in negotiation theory about the importance of demonstrating
empathy (i.e., demonstrating to the other side that one understands
what they are saying) so that they will in turn listen to what one has
to say.8 5 A similar dynamic occurs here. A client who feels heard will
be more willing to listen.
2. A Spectrum of Discourse: Confrontation, Indirection, and
Engagement
How then is the lawyer to raise the issue of responsibility taking
with the client? As mentioned, I do not believe there is a single opti-
mal approach. Rather, it is helpful to think of a range of approaches.
One way to characterize that range is in terms of a "confrontation"
spectrum. Below I discuss three points on this spectrum. I will call
these confrontation (most confrontational), engagement (moderately
83. For references, see Rhode, supra note 71, at 592-93 ("Bar literature has long
hosted laments for some happier era when law was a profession, not a business,
and lawyers were stewards of societal values, not servants of private profit.").
84. For one such view, see Paul J. Zwier & Ann B. Hamric, The Ethics of Care and
Relmagining the Lawyer/Client Relationship, 22 J. CONTEMP. L. 383, 387 (1996).
85. See MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 77, at 49.
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confrontational), and indirection (least confrontational). Visually, one
might image these as:
Confrontation Engagement Indirection
More Confrontational ( ) Less Confrontational
Two further notes. First, the word "confrontational" has different pos-
sible meanings. One can "confront an issue," "confront a person," or
"confront a person about an issue." The sense of "confrontational" in-
tended here is the third-the lawyer confronting the client about re-
sponsibility taking. (It is hard to imagine many circumstances where
the second sense confrontationalism-purely toward the person-is
appropriate in the lawyer-client relationship.) Second, for expository
purposes, I will discuss these three approaches in the following order:
confrontation, indirection, and engagement. In so doing, I do not
mean to imply the third approach of engagement is a golden mean
between the other two. While I am fondest of that approach, I stress
that I believe there is no single optimal approach appropriate in all
circumstances. The need for context-sensitivity in making such deter-
minations is paramount.
a. Confrontation
The clearest way to raise an issue with a client is to do so directly.
"Let me be straight. From everything you've told me, it sounds like
you were at fault here. In my judgment, you've got a basic choice to
make. You can deny what you did or you can take responsibility for it.
In my view, there are pros and cons to each which we can discuss if
you like, but that, as I see it, is the basic issue you face."8 6
To some lawyers such directness may seem the stuff of science fic-
tion. To others it may not. Thomas Shaffer recalls an experience as a
young lawyer in the early 1960s sitting in a partner's office listening
to the telephone conversation between the partner and a corporate cli-
ent about whether the client was under a legal obligation to desegre-
gate its factories. The laws were in the process of revision, and the
partner walked the client through complex details of why, despite the
revision, the client was not legally obligated to desegregate.
The [corporate secretary] said, at the end of all this, 'Well, what do you think
we ought to do?' My senior in the practice of law said, 'Oh, I don't think
there's much doubt about what you ought to do: you ought to integrate those
factories.' The secretary said, 'All right,' and hung up his telephone [and the
corporation proceeded to desegregate its factories.]8 7
The approach of Dallas attorney John McShane is also very inter-
esting. David Wexler writes that McShane,
86. Should the client insist on denial, the lawyer must then consider her response
carefully. See supra note 74.
87. SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 66, at 31.
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has a substantial criminal law practice that 'focuses solely on rehabilitation
and mitigation of punishment.' McShane is in private practice, and he can
pick and choose his clients. He chooses only those who agree to use the crisis
occasioned by the criminal case as an opportunity to turn their lives around.8 8
This might involve the client entering a drug treatment program, so
that later evidence of "the client's well-documented recovery, rehabili-
tation and relapse prevention plan [can be] presented to the judge in
mitigation of punishment."89
Neither the Shaffer or McShane examples are ones of pure confron-
tation. They are not "on all fours" with the hypothesized lawyer who
bluntly confronts the client about responsibility taking. In the Shaffer
case, the corporate secretary invites the lawyer's opinion. Further,
the matters of legal and moral responsibility clearly differ. In
McShane's practice, the responsibility-taking focus is not simply to-
ward the crime, but also toward underlying substance abuse
problems. Moreover, McShane describes his communication style as
compassionate rather than brusk and judgmental.90 Nevertheless,
these examples are suggestive of some important lessons.
A first lesson is what one might call being "tough on the problem,
but supportive of the person."9 1 Squarely confronting a client about a
difficult issue does not mean being disrespectful. Indeed, the more re-
spectfully confrontation is handled, the more likely it is to be effective.
Similar to a patient who wants his doctor to "tell it to me straight,"
many clients value blunt communication from their lawyers.92 For
some, the more direct the communication, the more respectful it is ul-
timately taken to be. The speaker's candor conveys that the speaker
sees the listener as an adult who can hear "the truth" and make his
own decision about it. In a way this is the opposite of the paternalist
who couches what she says for fear of the listener's negative reaction.
A second lesson is not to be overly fearful of alienating the client.
This is true not simply because the lawyer (like McShane) has the
right to determine the style of her practice and whom to represent but,
more deeply, because the essential goal of legal representation is serv-
ing the client's best interests rather than avoiding client alienation.
Akin to calls for "radical honesty" in psychotherapeutic counseling,
88. David B. Wexler, Robes and Rehabilitation: How Judges Can Help Offenders
"Make Good," 38 CT. REV. 18, 19 (2001).
89. John V. McShane, The Need for Healing: Addressing the Causes of Wrongdoing
Helps the Client and Society, 89 A.B.A. J. 59 (May 2003).
90. Id.
91. See, e.g., SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 66, at 99; ROGER FISHER ET AL., GET-
TING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 17-39 (2d ed. 1991).
92. As Thomas Morgan writes, "The thought that a lawyer should give a client the
kind of candid, tough advice which the lawyer would give a good friend may seem
radical or unnatural. Any other approach, however, may be less natural."
Thomas D. Morgan, Thinking About Lawyers as Counselors, 42 FLA. L. REV. 439,
459 (1990).
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there is a serious argument to be made that by telling the client the
truth the lawyer best serves the client, even if that means at times
alienating the client.93 What is essential is that the lawyer help the
client, not that the lawyer be liked by the client. The lawyer who fears
alienating the client should ask herself whether she does so with the
client's best interests at heart (e.g., "The client needs legal help, and if
I alienate him, he won't get that help.") or her own best interests at
heart (e.g., "If I alienate the client, he'll drop me and I'll lose income.").
A third lesson is that the justification for the confrontational ap-
proach gains particular force when one thinks, as with the addiction
issues McShane addresses, of the possibility of future repetition of
wrongful conduct by the client. This applies not only to individuals
but in the organizational context as well, where unaddressed
problems can recur for decades (e.g., the American Catholic Church
and pedophilia).
Finally, a confrontational approach need not be dramatic. One
method, for example, is to raise the possibility of responsibility taking
as one option in a matter-of-fact discussion of the menu of options the
client faces. Rather than singling out responsibility taking for special
treatment, approaching responsibility taking as a normal, possible op-
tion may help avoid anxiety in discussing that issue.
b. Indirection
At the opposite end of the spectrum from confrontation lies indirec-
tion. Here the lawyer's goal is not to raise the issue of responsibility
taking herself but to send the client down a path along which the issue
might get raised. Unlike direct confrontation, there is no guarantee
the issue will get raised along such a path. Simultaneously, there is
far less risk of client alienation.
Perhaps the most common indirect path is to bring the client to
mediation. As part of working toward settlement, mediators, particu-
larly evaluative ones, 94 often engage in "reality checking," that is, ask-
ing questions and presenting facts that are difficult for a party to face.
Many lawyers bring their clients to mediation for precisely this rea-
son.9 5 They want the mediator to be the "bad guy" rather than having
to be the "bad guy" themselves. Though reality checking is not identi-
93. See, e.g., BRAD BLANTON, RADICAL HONESTY: HOW TO TRANSFORM YOUR LIFE BY
TELLING THE TRUTH (1996).
94. For discussions of different styles of mediation, see Leonard L. Riskin, Under-
standing Mediators' Orientations, Strategies, and Techniques: A Grid for the Per-
plexed, 1 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 7 (1996); Leonard L. Riskin, Decisionmaking in
Mediation: The New Old Grid and the New New Grid System, 79 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1 (2003).
95. See, e.g., Bobbi McAdoo, A Report to the Minnesota Supreme Court: The Impact of
Rule 114 on Civil Litigation Practice in Minnesota, 25 HAMLINE L. REV. 401, 429
(2002) (reflecting a sample where in a significant (forty-seven) percent of cases,
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cal to raising responsibility taking, the two have much overlap. Note
too that a central feature of mediation is to bring the parties face-to-
face.9 6 As discussed further in section III.B, the typical pattern of de-
nial in litigation is characterized by compartmentalization-the com-
munication between the parties is highly restricted and stylized, the
handling of the disputed is delegated, history is reduced to facts rele-
vant to proving legal fault at trial, and so on. When an injurer comes
face-to-face with the person he injured, the injurer can no longer hide
not only from the injured party, but also from aspects of himself, such
as a sense of guilt or shame, that he might rather ignore. (This helps
explain why emotional outbursts are not uncommon in mediation.)
Further, as evidenced by the prevalence of apology within mediation,
mediation often does lead to responsibility taking.
Sometimes even more oblique means can be helpful. "Perhaps you
might want to take a few weeks to think things over?" "What does
your spouse think about this?" "When you look back at this years from
now, what do you want say about it all?" "Have you prayed about
this?" Such questions too may help move the client from narrow com-
partmentalization and short-run, shame-avoidant myopia to a place
where the client can be in touch with a fuller range of long-run inter-
ests, including moral, psychological, and relational interests. (We
sometimes use the word "wise" to describe the lawyer who can help
clients shift from a narrow focus to a broader one.) Perhaps the law-
yer can suggest other persons (with their permission, of course) who
have been in similar situations in the past with whom the client might
talk. Perhaps something as minor as the lawyer having photos of her
family in her law office can impart to the client the idea that what
takes place within law is not ultimately separate from what takes
place in life. Of course, there is no guarantee that such indirection
will lead the client to address the question of responsibility taking, but
sometimes it may.
c. Engagement
Somewhere between direct confrontation and oblique indirection
lies engagement. The idea here is to try to raise the issue of responsi-
the desire to provide a "needed reality check" for their own clients was a factor
prompting lawyers to choose mediation).
96. Though sometimes face-to-face contact between the parties is broken during me-
diation (e.g., as when a mediator caucuses privately with one side), and while not
all mediations do involve face-to-face contact of the parties (e.g., as in "online"
mediations of e-commerce disputes or with mediations conducted with only the
parties' lawyers attending), face-to-face contact between the parties remains a
defining feature of most mediation. Additionally, the non-verbal communication
present in face-to-face meetings generally helps promote trust among the parties.
See Janice Nadler, Rapport in Legal Negotiation: How Small Talk Can Facilitate
E-mail Dealmaking, 9 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 223, 228-29 (2004).
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bility taking by, to the degree necessary for the client to make his legal
choices, "going through" the client's experience.
The first, indispensable step is listening. As mentioned, in part
this is a matter of trust. To be willing to listen to their lawyers, most
clients must first feel heard. But there is more than just trust at
stake. Powerful emotions like guilt, shame, and anger often attach to
injuring others. Until those emotions are at some level recognized and
processed, the ability of the client to think clearly about denial and
responsibility taking may be greatly impaired.
To provide effective legal counsel, often the lawyer must listen for
not just the "facts" alone, but the client's experience of those facts.
"Tell me about it from the start." "How did you feel when that hap-
pened?" "How are you feeling about it today?" Though some may find
the overall approach advanced in this Article quite judgmental, 9 7 the
nonjudgmental, Rogerian roots of client-centered counseling are very
much what I have in mind.98 First, the lawyer listens nonjudg-
mentally to the client's experience. Occasionally, this may happen
during the first meeting, but typically it will take longer for a suffi-
cient level of trust to be established for the client to feel comfortable
sharing such feelings. As Bastress and Harbaugh write,
"[C]onfrontation-unless it relates to clarification of factual inconsis-
tencies-should not ordinarily be used in the early stages of the law-
yer-client relationship. The typically threatening nature of
confrontation can damage and stunt an undeveloped relationship."99
After the client has discussed his experience, the client's choice of
whether to take or deny responsibility can then be broached. "I'd like
to talk with you next week1 0 0 about some different possible paths we
might take, and hear where you want to go with this. Is there any
part of what occurred for which you feel responsible, and if so, would
you be willing to pay something for that? Would you rather we litigate
this? Maybe we can talk about some of the different options."
Some may ask whether such an approach invites the lawyer to
"practice psychology without a license." In my view, the answer is no.
The goal here is for the lawyer to provide the client with a full range of
legal services. For legal counseling on such matters to be effective,
addressing the client's emotions to a certain degree is often important,
if not essential. I would caution, however, that it is critical for a law-
yer to know the limits of her professional role and skills, and to refer
97. While the approach advocated here does call for some moral assessment of the
client's acts, the need for that assessment is rooted ultimately in client service.
98. See BINDER & PRICE, supra note 67, at 14-15; BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note
51, at 32.
99. BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 51, at 281.
100. I write 'next week," as time can be essential in helping clients address such
matters.
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clients to other professionals, like psychologists, when appropriate.' 0 l
Injurers, especially those who do so intentionally, often also need psy-
chological counseling. The lawyer should not seek to provide such
counseling. However, the lawyer must be sensitive to the role psycho-
logical and emotional issues can play in the client's legal choice-mak-
ing.1o 2 A similar point would apply, for example, to religious
counseling. The lawyer need not work through with the client the
ramifications of taking or denying responsibility in terms of the cli-
ent's religious belief system. The client should go to his clergy for
that. That, however, does not mean the lawyer should simply ignore
the possibility that the case has religious dimensions for the client.
Let me make three further comments about these different ap-
proaches. First, these approaches, especially engagement and con-
frontation, require a moderate degree of emotional competency by the
lawyer. 1o3 The lawyer needs to be comfortable with the client discuss-
ing or otherwise expressing feelings like shame, guilt, and anger. Not
all lawyers possess such counseling skills, and even those who do must
be sensitive to cultural barriers.1O4 Second, clients will differ in their
capacities and desires to discuss such emotions. For some, statements
such as, "I felt horrible when I realized I had . . ." come easily. For
others, they come not at all. Lawyers should be sensitive to such vari-
ety. Third, under any of these approaches, the lawyer's goal should
not be "salvational"-to turn the client into a moral being and per-
suade the client to make the moral choice.10 5 But neither should the
lawyer assume the worst about the client's morals. The goal rather is
similar to that of much moral counseling: to have a conversation that
assists the client by helping him understand the possible ramifica-
tions, including moral ramifications, of his choices.10 6 The choices are
101. Recall that the implicit classification of the client's problems as legal rather than,
say, psychological, is done by the client when he seeks legal counsel. The client
may of course be in error. See Walter 0. Weyrauch, Foreword: Legal Counseling
as an Intellectual Discipline, 42 FLA. L. REV. 429, 432 (1990).
102. See generally PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: LAW AS A HELPING PRO-
FESSION (Dennis P. Stolle et al. eds., 2000).
103. See DANIEL GOLEMAN, EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE : WHY IT CAN MATTER MORE
THAN IQ (1997); Marjorie A. Silver, Emotional Intelligence and Legal Education,
5 PSYCH. PUB. POL'Y & L. 1173 (1999).
104. As Michelle Jacobs writes, "Though, legal educators appear to assume counseling
skills are innate, clinicians would agree that in fact they are difficult to learn and
effectively employ." Michelle S. Jacobs, People from the Footnotes: The Missing
Element in Client-Centered Counseling, 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 345, 412
(1997); see also Carolyn C. Hartley & Carrie J. Petrucci, Practicing Culturally
Competent Therapeutic Jurisprudence: A Collaboration Between Social Work and
Law, 14 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 133, 162 (2004).
105. See Serena Stier, Legal Ethics: The Integrity Thesis, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 551, 566
(1991).
106. On the merits of such moral counseling, see generally Robert M. Bastress, Client
Centered Counseling and Moral Accountability for Lawyers, 10 J. LEGAL PROF. 97
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fundamentally the client's. The lawyer's essential role remains that of
service.
3. A Skeptical View and an Optimistic Response
Upon hearing my central claims-that, morally speaking, injurers
ought to take responsibility of their own initiative and that, from the
viewpoint of client service, their lawyers ought to consider discussing
this possibility with them-some will react with skepticism. "If men
were angels," a skeptic might say, "there would be no need for law.
Many clients and many lawyers are greedy. Whether consciously or
not, they will place their own financial interests before some claim of
what is right for them to do. Further, people who injure others are
likely to be low on the 'responsibility taking' scale to begin with. If
they were sensitive toward others, they would have been less likely to
have committed the injury in the first place.1O7 Your vision is idealis-
tic, but not realistic."
There is much force to the skeptic's view, and I suspect that in
many cases the skeptic will be descriptively right. (Indeed, the discus-
sion of economic incentives in section III.A. begins with the skeptic's
premise.) Yet the possibility for change should not be disregarded ei-
ther. As discussed above, injurers have moral, psychological, and rela-
tional interests as well as economic interests. Such noneconomic
interests give even self-interested injurers reasons to think seriously
about responsibility taking. The possibility that responsibility taking
will turn out to be economically beneficial should also not be dis-
counted. Indeed, even if their lawyers fail to raise responsibility tak-
ing with them, such reasons may lead some injurers to consider the
topic seriously.
Injury often offers the injurer a character-building opportunity.
For the injurer who would deny out of greed, it may be the chance to
place morality before money. For the injurer who would deny out of
shame, it may be the chance to accept one's human imperfection. So
too lawyers who discuss responsibility taking with clients may find a
deepened sense of meaning in law practice, a meaning derived from
providing a fuller range of service to the client, and, simultaneously,
from being a member of a profession that fosters moral behavior, so-
(1985); SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 66. Cf HAZARD, supra note 77, at 147
("A legal adviser should be reticent about incorporating morals or policy into his
advice.... ."). For a history of scholarship concerning the related topic of "moral
activism" by lawyers, see Paul R. Tremblay, Moral Activism Manque, 44 S. TEX.
L. REV. 127, 137-47 (2002).
107. Though obviously true in cases of intentional injuries, even in negligence cases, a
greater sensitivity toward others may lead to increased caution, which may de-
crease the chances of injury.
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cial healing, and just outcomes.10 8 The public perception of lawyers
may also improve, for little causes greater loss of public respect for the
legal profession than the view that lawyers help the guilty-in-fact go
free. For those lawyers who would fear losing business, recall the ad-
vice of attorney Abraham Lincoln: "Discourage litigation. Persuade
your neighbors to compromise whenever you can. Point out to them
how the nominal winner is often a real loser .... As a peacemaker the
lawyer has a superior opportunity of being a good man. There will
still be business enough."' 0 9 Even if denial is the norm, the hope ex-
ists that individual clients and individual lawyers will choose another
path.ii0
Finally, and it is here that I place my greatest hope, is the chance
that, as individual clients and individual lawyers choose a different
path, the norms within our legal culture will shift. I suspect that
many injurers deny and many lawyers fail to discuss with them the
possibility of responsibility taking because "that is the way it is done."
Without reflection, they simply slip into the common mode of re-
sponse."' Yet as discussions of responsibility taking become more
widespread, the modality that once seemed inevitable may no longer
seem inevitable. The experience over the past two decades with medi-
cal error may be instructive. In 1987, when the Lexington VA
switched from the denial approach to the responsibility approach after
medical error, it was viewed as bizarre. Roughly two decades later
numerous medical providers have adopted this approach,112 and dis-
cussions of apology in the medical context are becoming increasing
common."1 3 Innovative laws are being passed both requiring the dis-
closure of serious medical errors and even excluding apologies made
after medical errors from admissibility into evidence.1l 4 Minor fis-
sures can sometimes tumble a wall that once appeared rock solid.
108. See generally STEVEN KEEVA, TRANSFORMING PRACTICES: FINDING JOY AND SATIS-
FACTION IN THE LEGAL LIFE (1999) (discussing lawyers who found satisfaction
through transforming their legal practices); HOWARD GARDNER ET AL., GOOD
WORK: WHEN EXCELLENCE AND ETHICS MEET (2001) (emphasizing the impor-
tance of ethical pursuits to job satisfaction generally).
109. Abraham Lincoln, Lecture Notes, in 2 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN
81, 81 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
110. See REINHOLD NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SOCIETY: A STUDY IN ETHICS
AND POLITICS (1932).
111. See Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 63, 69 n.22 (1980) (quoting G.K. Chesterton, The Twelve Men, in TREMEN-
DOUS TRIFLES 57-58 (1955)) ("[T]he horrible thing about all legal officials, even
the best, about all judges, magistrates, barristers, detectives, and policemen, is
not that they are wicked (some of them are good), not that they are stupid (sev-
eral of them are quite intelligent), it is simply that they have got used to it.").
112. See Zimmerman, supra note 27.
113. See, e.g., Douglas N. Frenkel & Carol B. Liebman, Editorial: Words that Heal,
140 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 482 (2004); Mattera, supra note 27.
114. See Toward Candor, supra note 30.
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III. SOME STRUCTURAL FACTORS
To this point, I have addressed the denial found in ordinary law-
suits from the viewpoints of the individual client and the individual
lawyer. In this Part, I switch to a structural or systemic lens. My goal
here is to explore several broader factors that may buttress the prac-
tice of denial in ordinary civil disputes. The areas considered are eco-
nomic incentives, dispute resolution mechanisms, legal education, and
cultural composition, including rights-based ideology and social deni-
als of structural injustices. As noted at the outset, I do not attempt a
definitive treatment of these areas but seek to advance some basic
questions and hypotheses about the linkage between denial and these
areas. I also offer a few ideas toward possible reform. Fully evaluat-
ing these questions, hypotheses, and reform ideas must await another
day.
A. Economic Incentives
Earlier I raised, by way of objection to the idea that injurers would
be led (e.g., by moral reasons) to take responsibility of their own initia-
tive, the skeptic's view that economic forces alone drive the decisions
of many injurers. Some may argue, "Many injurers care only about
themselves, more specifically, their money." Indeed, some may argue
that corporate defendants, including insurance companies defending
those they insure against third-party claims, should only concern
themselves about profits.115 "Lawyers can talk with clients about the
moral, psychological, relational, and spiritual benefits of responsibil-
ity taking until they are blue in the face, but if the economic incentives
point the other way, clients will not do it."
One can try to challenge the premise that for those injurers solely
concerned with their wealth, denial is always the most strategically
efficacious path. Further, one can dispute the claim that corporations
have no obligations beyond profit maximization. 116 Nevertheless, the
115. See, e.g., Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its
Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32 (discussing business generally).
116. Exploring this issue fully is beyond my scope here; however, let me briefly outline
the structure of possible discourse. Those opposing corporate moral responsibil-
ity might stress the legal, rather than natural, personhood of corporations, and
highlight corporate fiduciary obligations to shareholders. On such fiduciary obli-
gations, see Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCI-
PALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 55 (John W. Pratt & Richard J.
Zeckhauser eds., 1985). Those advocating moral responsibility by corporations
may try to "pierce the corporate veil" and argue that legal constructions or fic-
tions should not erase basic moral responsibility (e.g., why should not a corpora-
tion have a duty to make amends for its missteps?). In the case of third-party
insurance, they may argue that even if, arguendo, the insurance company is not
under a moral obligation to take responsibility, the insured injurer is under such
a moral obligation (e.g., the injurer cannot erase his basic moral duty to take
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skeptic's challenge is a very serious one. Under our existing system,
the strategy of denial is often sensible from the economic viewpoint.
An injurer may reason: "If I accept responsibility I will have to pay.
But if I deny responsibility, there is a chance I can get away with it.
Putting aside for the moment legal fees, denial is like a no-lose gam-
ble. If the gamble fails, I'll just be made to pay what I would if I took
responsibility, but if the gamble succeeds, I'll pay nothing." Once legal
fees are factored in, the calculation is pretty similar. "If what I expect
to save by denying (i.e., the probability the court will make the wrong
decision multiplied by the damages) exceeds the expected increase in
legal fees due to extended legal proceedings, then denial still makes
sense."
The flaw in the current system is really quite simple. If the only
punishment for taking a cookie from the cookie jar is to return the
cookie if you're caught, there is little disincentive to stealing. Simi-
larly, if the only punishment for denying is to pay what you would pay
if you voluntarily accepted responsibility, there is little disincentive to
denying.
To illustrate the skeptic's logic more formally, I present below a
basic economic model of decision-making under uncertainty concern-
ing the injurer's choice of whether to admit or deny responsibility. 117
The model's essential point is implicit in the skeptic's comment.
Roughly put, awarding compensatory damages at trial encourages,
rather than discourages, denial. This model is, of course, a simplifica-
tion of reality. Nevertheless, it may help us understand some basic
dimensions of the injurer's choice, as well as some of the tradeoffs in-
volved in creating economic incentives that encourage, rather than
discourage, responsibility taking.
One advantage of a formal model is to make clear one's assump-
tions, even though those assumptions may be in part unrealistic.1 18
responsibility by ex ante having purchased liability insurance). Compare, e.g.,
PETER A. FRENCH, COLLECTIVE AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY (1984), and Rob-
ert Ashford, The Socio-Economic Foundation of Corporate Law and Corporate So-
cial Responsibility, 76 TuL. L. REV. 1187, 1191 (2002) (both arguing for corporate
moral responsibility), with Martin Benjamin & Daniel A. Bronstein, Moral and
Criminal Responsibility and Corporate Persons, in CORPORATIONS AND SOCIETY
277 (Warren J. Samuels & Arthur S. Miller eds., 1987) (arguing against corporate
moral responsibility). Note that insurance companies owe those they insure a
duty of good faith and fair dealing in responding to third-party claims. See INSUR-
ANCE BAD FAITH LITIGATION § 3.01 (Matthew Bender 2000); DENIS J. WALL, LITI-
GATION AND PREVENTION OF INSURER BAD FAITH §3.01 (2d ed. 1994).
117. See generally HOWARD RAIFFA, DECISION ANALYSIS: INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON
CHOICES UNDER UNCERTAINTY (1968).
118. See Milton Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSI-
TIVE ECONOMICS 3, 15 (1953) (defending the use of unrealistic assumptions). Cri-
tiques of Friedman's approach are many. See Amartya Sen, Description as
Choice, in CHOICE, WELFARE AND MEASUREMENT 432, 435-41 (1982). For further
[Vol. 84:247
CULTURE OF LEGAL DENIAL
In the model below, I begin with the following assumptions:1 ' 9 (1) the
injurer cares only about the economic consequences of his choices and
attaches no value to the morality or immorality of denial; (2) the in-
jurer is risk neutral, indifferent between the expected value of a gam-
ble and a sum certain in that amount; (3) the injurer knows with
complete accuracy whether he is guilty-in-fact or innocent-in-fact;120
(4) should trial result, the court will not be completely accurate in de-
termining guilt and innocence, but will make the wrong decision with
a known error rate; (5) should liability be found, the damages awarded
will be ordinary compensatory damages; and (6) unlike most economic
models of settlements, 12 1 settlement can be reached at only one
amount, namely, the level of compensatory damages.
discussion and references, see Jeanne L. Schroeder, Just So Stories: Posnerian
Methodology, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 351 (2001).
119. Later I shall relax assumptions (5) and (6).
120. One might think of injurers who either instinctively know this or can confidently
determine it after brief discussion with their lawyers.
121. There is rich literature on the economic analysis of settlement versus trial. For
an overview, see RicHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 567-77 (6th ed.
2003). The theoretical starting point for that literature is that settlement bar-
gaining takes place within the shadow of trial, and that, assuming, inter alia,
that the parties have a similar (probabilistic) expectation about what will happen
at trial, they should settle out of court around the level of that expectation rather
than incurring the litigation costs associated with going to trial. Under such a
view, trials, rather than settlements, are to be viewed as aberrant, which corre-
sponds well to empirical data reflecting that the vast majority of cases are settled
rather than tried. Id. at 567 ("[O]ne study found that only two percent of automo-
bile accident claims are actually tried, another that only four percent of all civil
cases in state courts are tried.") (citations omitted); see also Marc Galanter, The
Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and
State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. tbl. 1 (forthcoming Nov. 2004), availa-
ble at http://www.abanet.org/litigation/vanishingtrial/vanishingtrial.pdf (last vis-
ited Aug. 5, 2005) (indicating the from 1962 to 2002 the percentage of civil cases
disposed of by trial fell from 11.5% to 1.8%).
A basic premise of most economic models in this vein is the not-unrealistic
assumption that the settlement value is flexible. See, e.g., John P. Gould, The
Economics of Legal Conflict, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279 (1973); Steven Shavell, Suit,
Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis under Alternative Methods for Allo-
cation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55 (1982); George L. Priest & Benjamin
Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984). See
generally Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal
Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 J. EcON. LIT. 1067 (1989) (surveying that liter-
ature). By contrast, in order to highlight the basic moral choice of responsibility
taking versus denial, the model above assumes the settlement can only be struck
at the level of compensatory damages. One might imagine, for example, a "stub-
born" or "proud" injured party who, knowing he has been wrongfully injured,
would rather take the case to trial than accept a settlement lower than compen-
satory damages, even if he knows the expected value of trial is less than compen-
satory damages. Later I shall discuss relaxing this assumption. See infra note
134.
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Case I. The Guilty Defendant
Let us begin with the case of the injurer who knows he is in fact
guilty that he has committed an injury in violation of some law. 122
The basic choice the injurer faces is to either take responsibility for
what he has done or to deny it. If he takes responsibility, let us as-
sume that he and the injured party will quickly strike a fair settle-
ment at the level of compensatory damages ("Dc"). Let us assume too
that the injurer will also have to pay some (low amount) of legal fees
("Ls") in reaching that settlement. If instead the injurer denies re-
sponsibility, a trial will ensue. Let p be the probability the injurer will
be found liable at trial. Thus, 1 - p is the error rate of the trial pro-
cess, namely the probability that despite being guilty-in-fact the in-
jurer will be found not liable at trial. 12 3 Let DT be the damages that
will be awarded at trial if the injurer is found liable. Let Lr be the
total legal fees the injurer will incur by taking the case through trial,
and let the trial costs ("TC") be the difference between LT and Ls, that
is, the trial costs equal the extra legal costs the injurer will incur by
trying rather than settling the case (TC = Lr - Ls). Visually, the in-
jurer's choice may be represented as follows:
FIGURE 1
probability 1 of settlement
pay compensatory damages Dc
Accept pay lawyers' fees Ls
found liable pay trial damages DT
foundpr iabile pay lawyers' fees L--
found not liable pay no trial damages 0
probability 1 - p pay lawyers' fees LT
122. In this section, although I use the terms "guilty" and "innocent," the context is
still that of civil rather than criminal law.
123. The error rate of the trial process means simply the frequency with which trial
outcomes differ from defendants' actual guilt- or innocence-in-fact. This does not
necessarily mean that procedures were not followed properly at trial. For exam-
ple, suppose the defendant is guilty-in-fact, but the plaintiff lacks sufficient evi-
dence to prove it. Even if the court properly applies its own procedures and finds
the defendant not liable, it has still erred in a very basic sense.
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In such a situation, the injurer will choose to accept responsibility
("Accept") and settle the case if and only if the expected value of his
payment from accepting responsibility ["EV(Accept)"] is less than or
equal to the expected value of denying ["EV(Deny)"], that is
EV(Accept) _< EV(Deny).124
EV(Accept) = (1)(Dc) + Ls = Dc + Ls
EV(Deny) = [p(DT) + (1 - p)(0)] + LT = PDT + LT
/\
outcome if outcome if
found liable found not liable
Hence, the injurer will accept responsibility if and only if
Dc + Ls<5 PDT + Lr
or
Dc P pDT + TC (for TC = Lr - Ls).
Now let us suppose further that, if liability is found at trial, the
injurer will pay ordinary compensatory damages, so that DT = Dc.
Now, the injurer will accept responsibility if and only if
Dc < pDc + TC
or
TCl-p < -Dc
Hence, where the same damages would be awarded through settle-
ment and trial, the injurer will accept responsibility and settle if and
only if the error rate (1 - p) is less than the ratio of the trial expenses
to the damages. Conversely, if the error rate exceeds the ratio of trail
expenses to damages, the injurer will deny.
Intuitively this suggests that where the damage award will be the
same through settlement or trial, an injurer will only accept responsi-
bility if his legal fees for going to trial (TC) outweigh the expected sav-
ings from trial error. In other words, if the damages at trial are (only)
compensatory damages, the sole incentive the risk-neutral injurer has
to take responsibility and settle comes from decreased legal fees. Two
further observations are in order. First, the higher the error rate at
trial, the more likely the injurer is to deny, gambling that at trial he
will mistakenly be found not liable. Conversely, the more accurate the
trial process, the more likely the injurer will be to take responsibility.
Second, ceteris paribus, as the ratio of trial costs to damages de-
creases, the incentive to deny increases. In the extreme, as that ratio
approaches zero, the injurer will always deny responsibility if there is
some positive probability of trial error.
124. Though I use "5" for simplicity, technically the injurer is indifferent in the case of
strict equality.
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Observe that these results are driven in significant part by setting
the level of damages at trial (DT) equal to compensatory damages (Dc).
If accepting responsibility and settling the case results in compensa-
tory damages, and losing the case at trial will also result in compensa-
tory damages, there is little incentive for an injurer to take
responsibility rather than playing the no-lose gamble (except for in-
creased litigation costs) of taking the case to trial and possibly being
found not liable.
Case II. The Falsely-Accused Defendant
With an eye toward the later discussion of using damage multipli-
ers to "incentivize" the guilty injurer to accept responsibility, let us
consider too the case of the falsely-accused defendant who knows he is
in fact innocent. As with the preceding case, let us assume this defen-
dant cares only about the economic consequences of his choice to ei-
ther accept or deny responsibility, and places no value on the indignity
or immorality of a making false confession. Let p again be the
probability the defendant will be found liable. Thus, p, rather than
1 - p, now represents the error rate of the trial process, and 1 - p
represents the accuracy of the trial process.
Mathematically, the choice is identical to that of the guilty defen-
dant in Case I, and an identical calculus applies. Hence, the falsely-
accused defendant will (falsely) "accept responsibility" if and only if
EV(Accept) < EV(Deny), or, as derived above, Dc < pDT + TC.
Let us assume again that, as is usual, compensatory damages are
awarded at trial, so DT = Dc.125 As above, the defendant will (falsely)
accept responsibility if and only if
TC
- Dc
As 1 - p now represents the accuracy of the trial process, this suggests
that the falsely-accused defendant will only (falsely) accept responsi-
bility if the trial process is less accurate in probabilistic terms than
the ratio of trial expenses to damages.
B. Toward Creating Economic Incentives Against Denial
As discussed above, under our current rules, the injurer who
knows he is in fact guilty has relatively little incentive to accept re-
sponsibility. More specifically, it was presented that he would accept
responsibility if and only if Dc < pDT + TC, (if paying compensatory
damages in a settlement would be less than the expected value of
damages awarded at trial plus increased legal fees associated with go-
125. It might be imagined that, though the defendant was not at fault for the accident,
the damages to the plaintiff caused by the accident can be readily established,
making Dc a well-defined number.
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ing to trial). Under the usual legal standard where trial damages are
set at compensatory damages, the incentive is essentially against set-
tlement, for settlement would only occur if the error rate (1 - p) is less
than the ratio of trial costs to compensatory damages (TC/Dc). The
usual measure of damages within our civil legal system, compensatory
damages, creates an economic incentive to deny rather than take re-
sponsibility.126 One might think that wise public policy, by contrast,
would seek to align external incentives with moral behavior. For ex-
ample, by punishing theft, we create an incentive to do what is moral,
namely, not steal. The question thus arises of what might be done to
induce defendants who know they are guilty-in-fact to take responsi-
bility without coercing defendants who know they are innocent-in-fact
to falsely accept responsibility.
The first and no doubt best approach for a well-functioning legal
system is to reduce the error rate at trial. Consider the basic case
where trial damages are set at compensatory damages. As derived
above, both the injurer who knows he is guilty-in-fact and the falsely-
accused defendant will accept responsibility if and only if
TC1
-p< -.Dc
Note, however, that for the injurer who knows he is guilty-in-fact,
1 - p is the error rate of trial, whereas for the falsely-accused defen-
dant, p is the error rate at trial. Hence, the more accurate the trial
process (the lower 1 - p is for the guilty defendant and the higher 1 - p
is for the innocent defendant), the more likely it is that defendants
who know they are guilty will admit their guilt, and defendants who
know they are innocent will maintain their innocence.
A second approach is to adjust trial costs. One might, similar to
the British system, shift legal fees onto the loser at trial.127 One
might also consider simply raising or lowering trial costs. Observe,
however, that raising or lowering trial costs per se does not solve the
problems of denial by guilty defendants and false confessions by inno-
cent ones. For example, raising trial costs may induce more true con-
fessions by guilty defendants but may also induce more false
confessions by innocent ones, as both will accept responsibility if and
only if 1 - p < (TC/Dc).
126. A contrast might be drawn here to mandatory sentence reductions within the
criminal law for defendants who proactively accept responsibility, but not for de-
fendants who proclaim responsibility only after having put the government to its
burden of proof at trial. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDE-
LINES MANuAL § 3E1.1 (Nov. 2001).
127. There is comprehensive literature analyzing such fee-shifting rules (e.g., the Brit-
ish rule, FED. R. Civ. P. 68, etc.) from an economic perspective. See Symposium
on Fee Shifting, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 415 (1995).
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A third approach is to consider using damage multipliers to penal-
ize denial. 12 8 Recall that the basic economic force motivating an in-
jurer's denial under our current system is that, in many respects,
denial is a no-lose gamble. Suppose the injurer knows he is guilty. By
accepting responsibility he will have to pay compensatory damages,
but by denying his guilt he will only pay compensatory damages if he
is found liable. Thus, the decision to deny becomes the logical one.
But what if damages at trial were not simple compensatory damages
but some larger amount, such as a multiplier of compensatory dam-
ages.1 2 9 Now, the decision to deny would no longer be a riskless,
costless one. But at what level should such a multiplier be set? While
a damage multiplier may properly induce defendants who know they
are in fact guilty to admit their guilt, it may also create a greater in-
centive for falsely-accused defendants who know they are in fact inno-
cent to accept responsibility, lest a wrongful judgment be made at trial
resulting in an unbearable award.13o
As mentioned, one might hope that a well-designed trial process
would induce defendants who know they are guilty-in-fact to accept
responsibility and settle privately, but would not induce falsely-ac-
cused defendants to do so. What level of damage multiplier might do
this? For analytical simplicity, consider first the following case. Sup-
pose that compensatory damages greatly exceed trial costs, i.e., Dc >>
TC, or, in the alternative, that trial costs equal zero. Suppose further
that if liability is found at trial, trial damages DT will be set at some
multiple (m) of compensatory damages, so that DT = mDc.
Recall that both the guilty-in-fact defendant and the falsely-ac-
cused defendant will accept responsibility if and only if
Dc < pDT + TC .
As by assumption (1) Dc >> TC or TC = 0 and (2) DT = mDc, this
means he will accept responsibility if and only if
Dc < p(m)Dc
128. The approach here follows Bentham's use of multipliers to compensate for the
probabilistic detection of crime. See Jeremy Bentham, Principles of Penal Law,
in 1 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 365, 402 (John Browning ed., 1962) (1843)
("As there are always some chances of escape, it is necessary to increase the value
of the punishment, to counterbalance these chances of impunity."). For refer-
ences to recent scholarship, see Richard Craswell, Damage Multipliers in Market
Relationships, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 463 (1996).
129. See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic
Analysis, 111 HARv. L. REV. 869, 887 (1998) ("[1]f a defendant can sometimes es-
cape liability for the harm for which he is responsible, the proper magnitude of
damages is the harm the defendant has caused, multiplied by a factor reflecting
the probability of his escaping liability."); Richard Craswell, Deterrence and Dam-
ages: The Multiplier Principle and Its Alternatives, 97 MIcH. L. REV. 2185 (1999).
130. One response to this problem is to consider specific deterrents to false accusa-
tions. Note, however, that an analogous problem would arise with such deter-
rents, i.e., the risk of stifling valid claims.
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or
1
p
Recall that for the guilty-in-fact defendant 1 - p represents the error
rate, while for the falsely-accused defendant p represents the error
rate. Hence, the innocent-in-fact defendant will accept responsibility
if and only if
1
error rate
while the guilty-in-fact defendant will accept responsibility if and only
if
1
m > 1-errorrate(for as error rate = 1 - p, p = 1 - error rate).1 - error rate
Accordingly, if one wants a system where the guilty-in-fact defendant
will accept responsibility but the falsely-accused defendant will main-
tain his innocence, the damage multiplier m should be set such that
1 1
1 - error rate error rate
For example, if the error rate is 20%, m should be between 1.25 and 5;
30%, between 1.43 and 3.33; and 40%, between 1.67 and 2.50.131 In
general, the multiplier should be set between the inverse of one minus
the error rate and the inverse of the error rate. Note that, by defini-
tion, the error rate cannot exceed 1, and one would hope and expect
that the error rate would be less than 0.50, otherwise the court system
could do better by simply flipping a coin. This suggests using a multi-
plier of 2 in general, as for any error rate greater than 0 but less than
0.50 (i.e., 0 < error rate < .5), using a multiplier m of 2 will satisfy the
condition
1 1
1 - error rate error rate
Now, let us consider an example also involving trial costs. Suppose
Dc = 10, Ls = 1, LT = 3 (so TC = LT - Ls = 2),132 and the error rate is
25%. For simplicity, consider whole number multipliers. Consider
first the defendant who is in fact guilty: 1 3 3
131. Such figures are roughly in keeping with the common punitive damage multiplier
of 3.
132. One might imagine that these are in units of $100,000, so Dc = $1,000,000, Ls -
$100,000.
133. Recall these are amounts he must pay.
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If m = 1, he will deny, for EV(Accept) = 10 + 1 = 11
EV(Deny) = .75(1)(10) + 2 = 9.5
If m = 2, he will admit, for EV(Accept) = 10 + 1 = 11
EV(Deny) = .75(2)(10) + 2 = 17
If m = 3 or above, he will accept....
Consider second the falsely-accused defendant:
If m = 1, he will deny, for EV(Accept) = 10 + 1 = 11
EV(Deny) = .25(1)(10) + 2 = 4.5
If m = 2, he will deny, for EV(Accept) = 10 + 1 = 11
EV(Deny) = .25(2)(10) + 2 = 7
If m = 3, he will deny, for EV(Accept) = 10 + 1 = 11
EV(Deny) = .25(3)(10) + 2 = 9.5
If m = 4, he will admit, for EV(Accept) = 10 + 1 = 11
EV(Deny) = .25(4)(10) + 2 = 12
If m = 5 or above, he will accept....
Here it would be sound to use a damage multiplier of either 2 or 3, but
not 1 (too low) or 4 or above (too high). If the multiplier is 2 or 3, then
the guilty-in-fact defendant will want to accept responsibility, while
the innocent-in-fact defendant will maintain his innocence. If the
multiplier were only 1, the former would not occur; while if the multi-
plier were 4 or above, the latter would not occur.
Let me make several further notes. I intend the models above to be
only suggestive, to provide an analytic exposition that identifies some
of the basic choice dynamics. The model assumes that actual guilt or
innocence is known perfectly by the defendant in advance, that the
probability of error at trial is established and known, that only mone-
tary factors matter to the defendant, that the settlement value is not
flexible, 134 and so forth. Reality is far more complex than such simpli-
134. In order to illustrate aspects of the injurer's basic moral choice of whether to take
or deny responsibility, the model made the fairly unrealistic assumption that set-
tlement could only occur at the level of compensatory damages. See supra note
120. But what would happen if this assumption were relaxed and the parties
were able to adjust the settlement level (e.g., suppose the injured party was no
longer "stubborn" or "proud" but would accept a settlement offer less than the
level of compensatory damages)? For brevity, I will not present a formal model
here, but will instead offer a few general remarks.
Returning to the basic insight that parties with similar expectations about
trial would choose settlement around the level of the expected value of trial
rather than incurring the litigation costs, one would now expect the parties to
settle around expected value of trial. It is of course possible parties with similar
expectations would not settle. See generally BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION
(Kenneth Arrow et. al. eds., 1995); Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychologi-
cal Barriers to Litigation Settlement: An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L.
REv. 107 (1994). Consider the case where the parties know the injurer is guilty-
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fying assumptions, and a model built upon such assumptions should
be kept in appropriate perspective.
The essential lessons, however, may still be of significance. Our
society's typical approach of awarding ordinary compensatory dam-
ages at trial is a recipe for denial, not responsibility taking. When
coupled with the fact that courts make errors, this damages standard
creates a significant economic incentive for the injurer to deny. 13 5 No
doubt the best way to fix this is to improve the accuracy of the trial
process. Yet so long as courts continue to make errors-and some
level of adjudicative error seems inevitable-under the ordinary stan-
dard of compensatory damages a strong economic incentive to deny
will remain. In response, our society might think about measures to
penalize the act of denial, such as damage multipliers. Although es-
tablishing an adjudicative error ratio will not be simple, theoretically
speaking, we might adopt a damage multiplier lying between the in-
verse of the error rate and the inverse of one minus the error rate.
Even the use of a small multiplier (e.g., 1.5) may be enough to change
some behavior, sending the message, both symbolic and real, that de-
nial will be punished. It is one thing to say if you are caught stealing a
cookie from the cookie jar you must put it back. It is very different to
say that if you are caught stealing a cookie you must put one and one
half cookies back. Small changes in marginal incentives can some-
times produce dramatic changes in behavior. Finally, I do not mean to
suggest that multipliers are a panacea for this problem. Even if care
is taken so that such multipliers are not so great that they induce
innocent defendants to plead falsely, in those cases of judicial error
where innocent-in-fact defendants plead innocent but are nevertheless
in-fact but also know there is a chance the injurer would be found not liable at
trial. One would anticipate settlement to occur around the expected value of the
trial, namely, (1 - error rate)(Dc). Put differently, where the settlement value is
flexible, the injured party's compensation will be a fraction of ordinary compensa-
tory damages reduced by the probability of error at trial. One might call this
reduction, i.e., (error rate)(Dc), a "denial premium."
Let me make two further observations. First, from the moral viewpoint, the
appropriate settlement level where the injurer knows he is at fault is the level of
compensatory damages, Dc. By contrast, settlements discounted by the
probability of error at trial can hardly be called praiseworthy. Though they do
save the parties litigation costs, they (a) do not fully compensate the injured
party and (b) reflect at root a modified form of passive accountability rather than
internally-chosen responsibility by the injurer. Second, damage multipliers may
again be worth consideration. Where settlement values are flexible, damage mul-
tipliers may help to reduce or eliminate this "denial premium" by increasing the
expected value at trial to the level of compensatory damages. Multipliers, in
other words, change the probabilistic endowments against which bargaining in
the shadow of trial takes place. I would note, however, that this is also true in
the case of the falsely-accused defendant.
135. Or, if settlement values are flexible, to subsequently settle at a level less than
compensatory damages. See supra note 134.
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found liable, using a damage multiplier creates more unjust re-
suits.136 Above, I have sketched some of the most basic economic fea-
tures of the injurer's choice to deny, and tried to suggest some possible
responses, including damage multipliers. Fully evaluating the pros
and cons of such multipliers is well beyond my task here.13 7
C. Dispute Resolution Mechanisms
It is not surprising that an injurer's choice of whether to take or
deny responsibility can be influenced by the type of mechanism (e.g.,
litigation, mediation, etc.) through which the dispute is processed.
Such influence relates to different mechanisms' very purposes and
manners of functioning. I cannot fully explore this linkage between
dispute resolution mechanism type and the injurer's choice of taking
or denying responsibility here. However, let me make a few basic ob-
servations about it, particularly with regard to litigation.
Above I have been critical of the denial-promoting properties of our
litigation system. It must be remembered, however, that the essential
function of litigation is not promoting private responsibility taking but
enforcing a measure of accountability upon those who will not take
responsibility of their own volition and, simultaneously, achieving
some compensation for the injured. Litigation is the backup if agree-
ment cannot be reached elsewhere, more particularly, if the injurer
will not take responsibility of his own initiative.
Litigation should not, however, be the place where dispute resolu-
tion typically begins. The rules of evidence themselves imply this, en-
couraging private settlement by excluding from admissibility
statements made in settlement negotiations and, via the exception for
state privileges, in mediation. 138 The issue is not simply one of
wasted resources, delay, or the possibility of error at trial, but of mo-
rality. Morally speaking, the approach where the injurer voluntarily
accepts responsibility of his own initiative and the parties reach a mu-
tually-acceptable settlement is better than when the injurer is held
accountable in court. 13 9
136. From a social perspective, a higher multiplier is more likely to induce guilty-in-
fact defendants to accept responsibility of their own initiative; however, innocent-
in-fact defendants who deny guilt but are wrongfully found liable will pay a
higher price.
137. For example, multipliers are more likely to induce false confessions among risk-
averse innocent defendants than among risk-neutral innocent defendants. Multi-
pliers also implicate what one might call the injurer's dignity interest in not be-
ing forced to confess against himself.
138. See FED. R. EVID. 408, 501.
139. See Immorality, supra note 2, at section III.A; see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and Democratic Defense of Settle-
ment (in Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663 (1995). Cf Owen M. Fiss, Against Set-
tlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
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Are there particular features of litigation that promote the in-
jurer's choice to deny? Conversely, are there aspects to other dispute
resolution approaches that help promote responsibility taking? While
much of the discussion above focused on economic incentives within
litigation, I also mentioned that litigation is characterized by "com-
partmentalization"-the injurer "hands over" the dispute to a lawyer;
dialogue is restricted and stylized; there is a narrow focus on legal
fault; and so on. Here, I would like to expand briefly on two particular
pieces of such compartmentalization. These are (1) the "distancing" of
the injurer from the injury, in particular through the avoidance of
face-to-face contact between the injured and the injurer, and (2) the
formal absence of people with close prior connections, like family and
friends, to the injurer. Please note, I offer these remarks by way of
observation, not criticism, of the litigation process. 140
Often injurers hire lawyers, in particular litigators, with the goal
of "letting the lawyer take care of it." As mentioned, one of the first
messages an injurer receives from his lawyer is to cease communicat-
ing with the injured party, and, when necessary, to let the lawyer com-
municate on his behalf. The lawyer and the litigation process become
a shield from direct contact with the injured. Positively framed, this
may help the injurer gain peace of mind by putting the dispute "out of
mind" or at least decreasing the attention he gives to it. The mecha-
nism, in other words, helps distance the injurer from the dispute.
Critical to this is the avoidance of face-to-face contact with the injured.
As mentioned, wrongful injury typically generates feelings of guilt
and/or shame within the injurer. By avoiding contact with the in-
jured, the injurer can often-temporarily at least-avoid contact with
those internal feelings. Yet it is precisely those internal feelings that
so often drive the impulse to take responsibility. Hence, through sepa-
rating the injurer from the injured, the mechanism helps to foster the
injurer's denial. Conversely, mechanisms such as mediation which
promote face-to-face contact between the injurer and the injured are
likely to put injurers in touch with those internal feelings. As men-
tioned, when an injurer comes face-to-face with the person he injured,
he can no longer hide not only from the injured party, but also from
aspects of himself (e.g., his sense of guilt or shame) that he might
rather ignore. A powerful example of this comes from victim-offender
reconciliation programs in the criminal setting. Injurers, including
those already incarcerated, often report that meeting with their vic-
tims is quite difficult.141
140. For example, justification may exist for separating injured and injurer in terms of
violence prevention, emotional safety of injured, etc.
141. See Robert B. Coates & John Gehm, An Empirical Assessment, in MEDIATION AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: VICTIMS, OFFENDERS AND COMMUNITY 251, 256 (Martin
Wright & Burt Galaway eds., 1989); see also 48 Hours: My Daughter's Killer
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The formal absence of people with close prior connections to the
injurer, such as family and friends, is another important feature of
litigation supporting the denial. Put differently, litigation (and many
other common forms of dispute resolution) is in large part conducted
by strangers to the underlying dispute. Though the roots of the An-
glo-American system stem from a time when, interestingly enough,
jurors were often required to come from the neighborhood where the
facts giving rise to the dispute occurred 142 (and might thus have prior
knowledge of the parties or dispute), under the current system such
prior contact would provide an almost automatic grounds for the per-
emptory challenge of a juror or the recusal of a judge. Motivated by
impartiality, we want judges and juries who are strangers to the par-
ties, and metaphorically envision justice as a blindfolded woman hold-
ing impartial scales. Further, Charles Fried's analogy not
withstanding, one's lawyer is not typically a close friend, but a hired
professional.1 43 Family and friends of the injurer may of course at-
tend a trial, either for support or as witnesses, but their presence is
essentially happenstance. There is no formal role across cases for per-
sons close to the injurer.
An interesting contrast is found in the Navajo "circling" approach
to disputes.14 4 Though the professionals may still be strangers,
"[e]very person concerned with or affected by the dispute or problem
receives notice of a gathering to talk things out[,]" a gathering where
"[tihe parties and their relatives come together in a relaxed atmos-
phere to resolve the dispute."145 People in close relationships with the
parties are formally invited to participate, and the expectation is that
the injurer will accept responsibility within this process. Consider too
the statement the Navajo use, both within and outside such circles, to
rebuke a wrongdoer: "You act as if you had no relatives."146
(CBS television broadcast, Feb. 4, 1999) (showing imprisoned murderer awaiting
execution who described meeting mother of victim in the context of a victim of-
fender mediation program as the hardest thing he had done in his life).
142. See WILLIAM FORSYTH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY 134 (1971).
143. See Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Law-
yer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L. J. 1060 (1976). For a critique, see Edward A.
Dauer & Arthur Allen Leff, Correspondence, 86 YALE L.J. 573 (1977).
144. See James W. Zion, The Navajo Peacemaker Court: Deference to the Old and Ac-
commodation to the New, 11 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 89 (1983); see also Raymond D.
Austin, ADR and the Navajo Peacemaker Court, JUDGES J., Spring 1993, at 8. See
generally Philmer Bluehouse & James W. Zion, Hozhooji Naat'aanii: The Navajo
Justice and Harmony Ceremony, 10 MEDIATION Q. 327 (1993); Robert Yazzie,
"Life Comes from It": Navajo Justice Concepts, 24 N.M. L. REV. 175 (1994); How-
ard L. Brown, The Navajo Nation's Peacemaker Division: An Integrated, Commu-
nity-Based Dispute Resolution Forum, 24 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 297 (2000).
145. Yazzie, supra note 144, at 182-83 (emphasis added).
146. Austin, supra note 144, at 10.
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Though I will not explore it here, it is noteworthy that the Navajo
circling approach arises against a different culture backdrop, a culture
rooted in respect and responsibilities toward others as well as clan
and kinship relations, 14 7 and one must be cautious, of course, not to
presume this approach can be readily adopted by non-Navajo cul-
tures. 148 Rather I wish to use this approach as a means of contrast
with ordinary litigation. In ordinary litigation, shame-and here I
mean not the internal feeling of shame but the experience of external
shame-is generally delayed and in some ways muted.149 Shame is
delayed in that it is largely (though not exclusively) experienced after
the verdict is reached. Shame is muted in that such an announcement
is made by strangers often in front of strangers. Under the Navajo
process, shame usually touches the injurer earlier as friends and fam-
ily prepare for the upcoming circle. Shame also has a stronger qual-
ity, for one's friends and family are present at the circle. The presence
of parents, spouses, neighbors, siblings, and so on helps transform the
injurer from an atomistic person without responsibilities toward
others into a relational person (e.g., a child, spouse, neighbor, or sib-
ling, respectively) with responsibilities. In litigation, one sometimes
feels the impulse to "shake" the injurer and ask, "Didn't your parents
teach you anything?" or, "What would your mother say if she knew
this?" The circle inherently does such shaking through the presence of
family members. Just as it is harder to hide from morality when one
confronts the injured face-to-face, it is also harder usually to hide from
morality when one is surrounded by one's family. The process is con-
science-evoking rather than conscience-avoiding.
A second and related aspect of having family and friends present is
support. As discussed, facing one's errors, especially those that have
injured others, is a difficult process for most. Though some prefer to
walk that road alone, many benefit from the help of family and
friends. "Even though you have done something wrong, we still care
about you," is the message conveyed. The presence of family and
friends thus functions like a double-edged sword against denial: pierc-
ing the injurer's ability to avoid his moral debt and simultaneously
enhancing his ability to pay that debt.
147. On culture's influence on responsibility taking, see infra section III.D.
148. See generally Carole E. Goldberg, Overextended Borrowing: Tribal Peacemaking
Applied in Non-Indian Disputes, 72 WASH. L. REV. 1003 (1997).
149. See generally BRAITHWAITE, supra note 5; Thomas J. Scheff, Community Confer-
ences: Shame and Anger in Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 67 REV. JuR. U.P.R. 97
(1998); ELIZA AHMED ET AL., SHAME MANAGEMENT THROUGH REINTEGRATION (Al-
fred Blumstein & David Farrington eds., 2001).
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D. Legal Education
Educational processes typically have multiple aims. Some of these
aims are articulated. Some-often the most important-are not. One
of legal education's most basic unarticulated goals may be preparing
students to be complicit in denial. This is a function of readying stu-
dents for their subsequent careers. Legal employers hire lawyers to
help their clients win cases. The best product in the legal employment
market is the lawyer who can skillfully argue for either side, and it is
that product most law schools seek to produce. The most hireable are
those willing, at least at times, simply to be "hired guns." It is of
course easiest if the lawyer's sympathies generally align with the cli-
ent's position, as when a left-leaning lawyer works as a public de-
fender. However, even left-leaning public defenders must sometimes,
if not most of the time, represent clients who are guilty-in-fact. A ped-
agogical key to legal education is preparing students to advocate for
clients whose positions they believe or strongly suspect to be unjust.
Students commonly enter law school with the hope of serving cli-
ents who are in the right. To the extent they think of such matters
(and often they do not), they imagine themselves like Atticus Finch,
defending the wrongfully accused, or Erin Brockovich, seeking redress
for the wrongfully injured. Their heros are lawyers whose clients are
in the right, so that by fighting for their clients they are simultane-
ously fighting for justice. Yet by the time they leave law school, stu-
dents will have been trained to represent either party, to function as
lawyers both for the side whose cause they believe just and for the side
whose cause they believe unjust.150 In particular, students will be
ready to assist injurers in denying harms they know they have com-
mitted. This conversion is no mean feat. As denial after injuring an-
other is a fundamental act of moral regression, assisting an injurer in
denial raises serious issues of complicity. How is this conversion ac-
complished? How do law schools teach students to be readily complicit
in denial? Consider three factors: (1) training in subordinating moral
sensibilities and feelings to technical argumentation; (2) training in
the ideology of winning; and (3) training against facing one's own er-
rors openly and squarely.
1. Subordinating Moral Sensibilities and Feelings to Technical
Argumentation
Lawyers who assist injurers in denying responsibility must either
rationalize their role (e.g., give a systemic defense of the ethics of zeal-
ous advocacy) or, as is more common, simply detach from their moral
sensibilities. The process of teaching students to detach from their
150. For a polemic to the contrary, see Duncan Kennedy, The Responsibility of Law-
yers for the Justice of Their Causes, 18 TEx. TECH L. REV. 1157 (1987).
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moral sensibilities usually begins at the start of law school. 15 1 Most
can recall a first-semester staple such as the gruesome lifeboat case
Regina v. Dudley and Stephens,152 which rejected a "necessity" de-
fense to murder and cannibalism when faced with the prospect of star-
vation at sea, or the cold-hearted contracts case Mills v. Wyman, 15 3
finding a father's after-the-fact promise to pay a Good Samaritan who
had cared for his son through illness and eventual death unenforce-
able for lack of consideration ("past consideration is no considera-
tion"). The usual justification for teaching such cases is, to use
Holmes' phrase, to help students avoid, "confusion between legal and
moral ideas,"'154 that is, to follow law's logic even in morally-problem-
atic settings.15 5 On the surface this goal appears sound, for lawyers
must at times apply law to difficult settings. Yet such cases impart a
subtler message too-put one's feelings aside.15 6 The unarticulated
lesson is that we the lawyers simply go forward in a thick-skinned
151. For critiques, see THOMAS L. SHAFFER, Moral Moments in Law School, in ON BE-
ING A CHRISTIAN AND LAWYER, supra note 60, at 165, 165-76; Walter H. Bennett,
Jr., Making Moral Lawyers: A Modest Proposal, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 45 (1986);
James R. Elkins, Moral Discourse and Legalism in Legal Education, 32 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 11 (1982); Steven Hartwell, Moral Growth or Moral Angst? A Clinical Ap-
proach, 11 CLINICAL L. REV. (forthcoming 2004); David A.J. Richards, Moral The-
ory, The Developmental Psychology ofEthical Autonomy and Professionalism, 31
J. LEGAL EDUC. 359 (1981-82). Cf. Thomas E. Willging & Thomas G. Dunn, The
Moral Development of the Law Student: Theory and Data on Legal Education, 31
J. LEGAL EDUC. 306, 358 (1981-82) ("Our data [supports the view] that the con-
cerns of students for justice and humaneness are neither nurtured nor impeded
by the process of legal education.").
152. 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884).
153. 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 207 (1825).
154. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, Address at Dedication of New
Hall at Boston University School of Law (Jan. 8, 1897), in 10 HARV. L. REV. 457,
459 (1897).
155. Consider Thomas Shaffer's description of Karl Llewellyn's teaching:
Llewellyn told [entering University of Chicago law] students that they
were welcome to their morals but that their morals had little to do with
the culture of lawyers. 'The hardest job of the first year,' he said, 'is to
top off your common sense, to know your ethics into temporary anesthe-
sia. Your view of social policy, your sense of justice - to know these out
of you along with woozy thinking.'
SHAFFER, supra note 60, at 165 (quoting Llewellyn).
156. Such cases also impart a message of social detachment. As Peter Gabel writes:
The use of the Mills v. Wyman case in the first-year law school curricu-
lum demonstrates that [legal education] involves an unconscious indoc-
trination of students into a set of values that define community members
as strangers existing at 'arm's length' who are not bound to each other if
their respective self-interests-understood only in the material sense-
are not served.... In place of an empathic expression of social concern,
students learn that the correct legal response is a detached, unfeeling,
analytical mode of rule application.
Peter Gabel, Spirituality and Law, 18 TIKKUN 2, 38 (2003). For a detailed analy-
sis of this case, see Geoffrey R. Watson, In the Tribunal of Conscience: Mills v.
Wyman Reconsidered, 71 TuL. L. REV. 1749 (1997).
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manner without attending to our feelings. When such cases are
taught, not typically discussed in the classroom are internal emotional
matters like how it feels to read about murder and cannibalism, or
how it feels to learn of the illness and death of a 25-year-old (the ap-
proximate age of most law students), the Good Samaritan's care, and
the father's selfishness. If the only point to such cases were to teach
legal doctrine, less gruesome and poignant cases could have been se-
lected. Similar to medical students cutting into their first cadavers,
ultimately the pedagogy is about both the subject and what it means
to be a professional in such fields. Were it not there already, cases like
these insert a wedge between the student's head and the student's
heart.
The lesson of emotional detachment, however, is too important to
be relegated to a first-year case or two. Rather, it is honed day after
day through the supremacy given to technical argumentation in class-
room discussion. By technical argumentation, I mean learning to ar-
gue and reason within the legally-relevant universe of rules and
precedent. "I do not care how you feel," says the professor, "what mat-
ters is what legal argument you can make." Under this view legal
analysis is at root an objective, mental, and logical process of thought
and not a subjective, personal, and erratic process of feeling. 15 7 Preci-
sion and precedent are emphasized; inner feelings are discounted.158
Further, though the law is of course meant to apply to real human
situations, aside from a possible upper-level elective clinical course,
actual human clients are not encountered. Rather, students read ab-
stract descriptions of facts, both in hypotheticals and, as is more com-
mon, from case law. Note too that, despite the fact that few lawyers
work at the appellate level, the cases read in textbooks come mostly
from the cerebral, detached world of appellate case law. The paragon
of legal understanding is an opinion rendered by a detached appellate
judge who lacks any personal knowledge of the parties or the dispute.
A basic lesson, then, is that being a lawyer involves detachment from
one's feelings, including one's feelings about the merits of a case. 15 9
The problem is that justice and injustice are in many ways matters of
157. As Christopher C. Langdell wrote when introducing his pioneering casebook,
"Law, considered as a science consists of certain principles and doctrines. To
have such a mastery of these as to be able to apply them with constant facility to
the ever-tangled skein of human affairs, is what constitutes a true lawyer... "
CHRISTOPHER C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS VI
(1871).
158. For a critique, see David R. Culp, Law School: A Mortuary for Poets and Moral
Reason, 16 CAMPBELL L. REV. 61 (1994). On the importance of emotions to the
law generally, see THE PASSIONS OF LAw (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999).
159. This separation of intellect and emotion ties to the use of the Socratic method
discussed below. See Andrew S. Watson, The Quest for Professional Competence:
Psychological Aspects of Legal Education, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 91, 124 (1968) ("I
want to reemphasize the fact that the Socratic Method exaggerates, and in a
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feeling and not simply of thought. They are in part things one feels in
one's gut. By teaching students to detach from their feelings, we si-
multaneously teach them to disregard their feelings of justice and
injustice.
As with the other pedagogical matters discussed below, there is of
course a logic to existing law school pedagogy. This logic is rooted in
the vision of the lawyer as advocate. A rough statement of this view is
as follows: "In the courtroom, it is the legal arguments one can make,
rather than appeals to sympathy, that a judge will entertain, so to
train students to be effective lawyers, we must train them to make
those legal arguments, which will sometimes require them to disre-
gard their feelings."16o The problem, however, is that effective lawy-
ering involves more than just advocacy. Parallel to the prior
discussion of the advocacy bias in legal representation, legal education
too suffers from an advocacy bias. The basic mistake is letting the one
admittedly-important goal of training law students to be effective ad-
vocates drive the entire educational process. Lawyers must function
not only as advocates but also as counselors and negotiators. Lessons
such as emotional detachment which can be essential to one role can
be antithetical to another.
2. Training in the Ideology of Winning
Detachment in place, the next lesson of law school is the ideology of
winning. Nowhere is this better represented than in moot court com-
petitions where victorious teams are those best able to argue both
sides of the case. 16 1 The formal expression of this ideology usually
comes through teaching about "zealous advocacy" in an upper level
professional responsibility course. But such is icing on the cake. In
contrast to many fields of instruction, legal classrooms consistently
emphasize skill in debate. The great lawyer can make night seem like
day and day like night. It is simply a matter of which cause she has
been hired to champion. The game is debate, and the goal is to win.
One's view of the merits of the case is irrelevant.
sense, distorts the importance of intellect . . . [when it] leads to an ablation of
emotional awareness .... ").
160. Judges and juries are not motivated solely by legal logic, and effective advocacy
may sometimes involve subtly appealing to sub rosa factors. See generally Lynn
M. LoPucki & Walter 0. Weyrauch, A Theory of Legal Strategy, 49 DuKE L.J.
1405 (2000).
161. The sentiments of the British Barrister Cross are similar:
[It is sometimes more fun to have a bad case than a good one for it tests
your powers of persuasion more severely. Certainly I have seldom felt
better pleased than when I persuaded three out of five law Lords [i.e.,
the court] to come to a decision which I was convinced was wrong ....
Warren Lehman, The Pursuit of a Client's Interest, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1078 (1979)
(first alteration in original) (quoting Rt. Hon. Lord Cross of Chelsea). Under such
an approach, law essentially becomes a game or sport.
20051
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
Now I do not suggest that teaching students to understand and
articulate both sides of an argument should have no place in legal edu-
cation. A skilled advocate and counselor must anticipate the other
side's position. Nor do I suggest that training for adversarialism is
without ethical defense. Many accept the "systemic" defense of zeal-
ous advocacy that, like blades of a scissors cutting, it is through each
side having advocates zealously argue their case that truth and justice
are found, and the sharper the blades, the more precise the cutting.16 2
Rather it is my impression that many students give little thought to
either the theoretical defenses of zealous advocacy or the criticisms of
it. It is not that most students believe justice will be best served
through zealous advocacy, but simply that zealous advocacy is what
they are being trained to do and that for which they will be hired.
3. A Note on Lawyer Psychological Dysfunction
Both here and elsewhere I have argued for paying greater atten-
tion to a case's underlying merits from the perspective of the client-
that clients who deny injuries they have caused may face serious spiri-
tual, relational, and psychological risks. A few words may also be in
order about the risks to lawyers of being complicit in such denial. I
will not treat this subject in depth. Let me simply suggest a few basic
ideas.
It is well-documented that levels of psychological distress and dys-
function rise markedly among students over the course of law school,
and further that such levels remain very high among practicing law-
yers.1 63 Though there are undoubtedly many causes for this, complic-
ity in wrongful denial, as well as complicity in unwarranted
accusation, may play an important role. To see some basic aspects of
this, consider a simple hypothetical.
Suppose a student John arrives at law school wanting to be like
Atticus Finch, more specifically, to represent only clients with just
claims and defenses. However by the end of law school, he is trans-
formed into a hireable gun who will zealously represent any cause ir-
respective of the underlying merits. Suppose further that John has
become what one might call an unreflective hireable gun who derives
pleasure only from victory and the money that flows from it rather
162. FREEDMAN, supra note 7, at 3-4.
163. See Susan S. Daicoff, Lawyer and Law Student Distress, in LAWYER, KNOW THY-
SELF: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF PERSONALITY STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
113-39 (2004); Lawrence S. Krieger, Institutional Denial About the Dark Side of
Law School, and Fresh Empirical Guidance for Constructively Breaking the Si-
lence, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 112, 114-15 (2002); see also Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being
a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an Unhappy, Unhealthy, and Unethical
Profession, 52 VAND. L. REV. 871 (1999) (discussing the unhappiness and poor
health that characterizes the legal profession).
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than from, as Monroe Freedman might, a sophisticated justification of
his role in a larger system. What are the implications of this transfor-
mation for John's psyche?
First and foremost, John has learned to "tune out" his own sense of
conscience. This is a tremendous diminishment of what it means to be
a human being. Further, in the long run, it is likely to be quite dam-
aging to John's mental health. One's conscience does not simply dis-
appear when disregarded, even if it is repressed to the subconscious.
Erecting a mental barrier between oneself and one's moral sensibili-
ties is a very risky path. A related aspect of John's psychological vul-
nerability is that John has learned to disregard the intrinsic for the
extrinsic.164 Pursuing justice is largely an intrinsic goal, i.e., a goal
that a person, upon reflection, has deep reasons to care about. It is
likely to be a psychologically-robust goal: whether one achieves it or
not, one will feel validated by the attempt. Seeking victory over an-
other, by contrast, is a largely extrinsic goal. Success is by definition
relative (one only succeeds if another loses), success is typically
delayed (one cannot "succeed" until a verdict is rendered), and success
is often erratic (if trial lawyers can only be happy when they win, then
half are destined to be unhappy at any given moment). Though one
might accept it intuitively, the view that people who pursue extrinsic
goals are at far greater levels of psychological risk than those who pur-
sue intrinsic goals is also confirmed by empirical research. 165 The
"ethics" of winning are in many ways a formula for a lawyer's ultimate
psychological collapse.
4. Training Against Facing One's Errors Openly and Squarely
Teaching students to superordinate technical argumentation to
personal feelings and to accept the ideology of zealous advocacy are
relatively overt functions of legal education. I wish now to focus on a
third, largely sub rosa aspect of legal education that contributes to the
lawyer's ready complicity in denial: shame in error. Make no mis-
take, though this pedagogical lesson is largely unarticulated, its ef-
fects may too be profound.
Responsibility taking involves facing the shame of one's mistakes,
and to counsel clients effectively about responsibility taking lawyers
must be able to "go there" themselves; they must be comfortable facing
human error and the shame that can attach to it. Yet often the train-
ing of law school is precisely the opposite, it is a training in the inabil-
ity to openly face errors and the shame that can attach to them.
164. See generally Kennon M. Sheldon & Lawrence S. Krieger, Does Legal Education
Have Undermining Effects on Law Students? Evaluating Changes in Motivation,
Values, and Well-Being, 22 BEHAV. SCi. & L. 261 (2004).
165. For references, see id. at 263-64.
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One of the most distinctive features of legal education is its perva-
sive "Socratic" method, and one of the distinctive features of the So-
cratic method is the possibility of public humiliation. Benignly
viewed, under the Socratic method, expert professors pose simple
questions designed to help students recognize the contradictions
within their own arguments. Yet such conversations take place in
large classrooms, often with a hundred or so spectators. Students, by
definition inexpert in the materials, are questioned publicly by expert
professors. Though very few professors seek to humiliate students,
the risk and sometimes experience of public humiliation is quite
real, 166 and students learn to project competency, whether felt or not.
Further, a deep message is imparted: What's the basic approach to
errors? Not to make them. Errors, it is implicitly taught, bring a
shame and humiliation that is to be avoided.
It is no surprise then that students so trained should have diffi-
culty talking with clients about responsibility taking. Their law
school experience is built in part around using shame as an incentive
against making errors. Many students graduate not simply unpre-
pared but negatively prepared to help others face error and shame
compassionately. Experience, not rhetoric, is ultimately the greater
teacher. The attitudes toward error students experience in the law
school classroom are what they in turn apply in practice.
166. See Watson, supra note 159, at 119-22 (describing the Socratic method as an
"invasion pos[ing] a grave threat" to students); see also Alan A. Stone, Legal Edu-
cation on the Couch, 85 HAav. L. REV. 392 (1971). Though the demographic com-
position of both law students and professors has changed markedly since
Watson's observations nearly four decades ago, discussions of the possibility of
student humiliation through the Socratic method, as well as calls to avoid such
humiliation, continue to this day. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Rosato, The Socratic
Method and Women Law Students: Humanize, Don't Feminize, 7 S. CAL. REV. L.
& WOMEN'S STUD. 37, 40-43 (1997); Robert P. Schuwerk, The Law Professor as
Fiduciary: What Duties Do We Owe to Our Students, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 753,
770-72 (2004). Of particular note are feminist critiques of the Socratic process.
See, e.g., Symposium on Civic and Legal Education: Panel One: Legal Education,
Feminist Values, and Gender Bias, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1525 (1993); Lani Guinier et
al., Becoming Gentlemen: Women's Experiences at One Ivy League Law School,
143 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 45-51 (1994); Rosato, supra. Law schools are not, of course,
the only educational institutions which mistakenly "use" the risk of public humil-
iation in an effort to promote learning. The practice often begins much earlier in
the educational process. See, e.g., John Holt, How Teachers Make Children Hate
Reading, in THE NORTON READER: AN ANTHOLOGY OF EXPOSITORY PROSE 189, 191
(Arthur M. Eastman et al. eds., 3th ed. 1977) ("From the very beginning of school
we make books and reading a constant source of possible failure and public hu-
miliation [by making children] read aloud, before the teacher and other children
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5. Toward Reform
Having criticized our existing pedagogy, let me make some positive
suggestions. I do not think there is one simple remedy for the issues
discussed above. Though the basic goal of training lawyers to function
effectively in the multiple roles they must play is clear, the means
toward that goal are likely multifaceted. Professional responsibility
courses might emphasize the value of legal services beyond simply
winning, and teach means, such as journal writing, for fostering self-
awareness. Legal counseling courses might be offered or required ear-
lier in the curriculum to impart the subtleties of that craft. Steps
might be taken to ensure that legal classrooms are safe and support-
ive places to make mistakes, rather than risky and humiliating
ones. 16 7 This need not involve dropping all Socratic teaching, but
rather paying careful attention to the tone and manner in which it is
conducted. The essential question is whether one creates an atmos-
phere of respect and support or of power and shame. 168 No sacrifice to
intellectual rigor need be done to achieve the former. In short, the
imprint of the advocacy bias with legal education should be addressed
and the educational process retooled to adequately prepare students
for the varied tasks lawyers perform.16 9
E. Cultural Composition
Above I have argued that denial has become a legitimated, normal-
ized response to injury within our culture. Yet not all societies func-
167. See Bastress, supra note 106, at 137-38.
168. Of related interest are the effects of stress which can both motivate and (if exces-
sive) inhibit legal learning. For references, see Daicoff, supra note 163, at
118-19; Richard Sheehy & John J. Horan, Effects of Stress Inoculation Training
for 1st-Year Law Students, 11 INT. J. STRESS MGmT. 41 (2004).
169. Law schools may also wish to reconsider the standards by which students are
admitted. Although law school admissions processes do typically require per-
sonal statements and letters of recommendation, the foundation of admissions
remains the technical measures of college GPAs and LSAT scores. For example,
at the University of Florida where I teach, for years half of the entering class has
been "presumptively" admitted based upon these two measures. From the view-
point of lawyer complicity in denial, this is significant, for neither GPAs nor
LSATs measures important factors relevant to the counseling of responsibility
taking, such as the applicant's interpersonal skills or commitment to justice. In-
deed, given the extent to which the practice of law requires interpersonal skills
and given that the legal profession's most basic articulated goal is the pursuit of
justice, the general absence of formal, systematized consideration of such factors
is quite astonishing. If we are to be serious about producing lawyers who will
discuss responsibility taking with clients-and, even more importantly, devote
themselves to the pursuit of justice generally-law schools should reconsider
their admissions standards. This may require increased efforts to provide more
textured assessment of candidates (e.g., through interviews, evaluation of past
work history, and community service, etc.), but the reward may well be worth the
price.
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tion in this manner. In Japan, the strong expectation is that people
who commit injuries will apologize.17o With the Navajo, as men-
tioned, there is a far greater moral focus on relationships and respon-
sibilities, and, simultaneously, an expectation that those who harm
others must make repair. 17 1 One thinks too of the abundance of law-
yers in America by international standards. 17 2 Accordingly, the ques-
tion arises-why has denial become a normal, legitimated mode of
response to injury within our society?173 Are there broader cultural
factors that help to reinforce it?
Let me state clearly that I cannot fully address these questions
here. As much fine research in legal anthropology reflects, there is
little doubt that manners of dispute processing within a society are
related to broader cultural factors (so such questions are worth explor-
ing), and there is little doubt that such relationships are often complex
(so such questions are not simple to answer).17 4 In the discussion be-
low, I do not mean to suggest that American culture is the only culture
where legally-legitimated denial occurs, nor do I assert any view on
the degree to which the factors discussed below are essential roots of
the type of denial we see in our culture. (Previously I have discussed
factors like shame avoidance, greed, and economic incentives within
litigation as important contributors to the denial we see.) Yet the
question remains to be asked about the influence of broader, cultural
factors on the practice of denial in ordinary legal disputes. In re-
sponse, let me consider two such factors. First is our culture's rights-
based moral focus and related beliefs about the accuracy of our courts.
Second is our history of what one might call "macroscopic" denial, that
170. See generally Hiroshi Wagatsuma & Arthur Rosett, The Implications of Apology:
Law and Culture in Japan and the United States, 20 LAW & Soc. REv. 461 (1986).
171. Yazzie, supra note 144, at 189.
172. Precise international comparison of this is difficult, as, among other things, the
licensing of lawyers varies significantly among countries. See Ray August, The
Mythical Kingdom of Lawyers: America Doesn't Have 70 Percent of the Earth's
Lawyers, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1992, at 72. However, "[iunformed estimates," writes
Deborah Rhode, "put the [percentage of the world's lawyers found in the United
States] somewhere between one quarter and one third[.]" Deborah L. Rhode, Too
Much Law, Too Little Justice: Too Much Rhetoric, Too Little Reform, 11 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 989, 991 (1998) (citing Marc Galanter, Pick a Number, Any Num-
ber, Legal Times, Feb. 17, 1992, at 26).
173. For references to comparative international studies, see Robert A. Kagan, Do
Lawyers Cause Adversarial Legalism? A Preliminary Inquiry, 19 LAW & Soc. IN-
QUIRY 1, 3 n.6 (1994). Kagan argues that American culture is characterized by a
high level of "adversarial legalism" and views lawyers as a contributor, but by no
means the only contributor, to this. See id. at 60. For a similar theme in a lin-
guistic vein, see DEBORAH TANNEN, THE ARGUMENT CULTURE (1998) (critiquing
the dominance of legalistic debate within American discourse generally).
174. See, e.g., The Disputing Process-LAw IN TEN SOCIETIES (Laura Nader & Harry F.
Todd Jr. eds., 1978); CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN
INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY (1983).
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is, committing mass injuries like conquest and slavery for which com-
pensation has essentially never been made. Again, I offer these topics
by way of question, investigation, and hypothesis. Full consideration
must await another day.
In our culture, the subject of morality is often framed in terms of
rights (what a person has the right to do) rather than in terms of re-
sponsibilities (what moral duties a person owes to others).1 7 5 Taking
responsibility after injury is by contrast definitionally and
paradigmatically a matter of responsibility. Further, the ultimate lo-
cus of rights is the courtroom. "If you can prove in court that I vio-
lated a right of yours, then I will pay. Otherwise, I owe you nothing."
Morality is in large part reduced to what can be proven at law.
Though askew, the moral "logic" runs as follows: "I only owe you a
moral debt if you can prove in court I owe you a legal debt." Denial
thus becomes a legitimate response to injury. Despite the many fine
arguments that have been advanced suggesting we pay more atten-
tion to responsibilities (Why, after all, must rights and responsibilities
be in competition? Cannot we respect both?), my sense is that our cul-
ture remains highly rights-oriented, frequently to the exclusion of at-
tention to responsibilities. If so, one topic for further research is to
what extent our cultural rights-orientation supports, and is supported
by, the practice of denial we see in ordinary legal disputes.
Also of interest may be research concerning the influence of trials
on denial. Trials are processes in which denial is expected and to
some degree legitimated. It is accepted that parties within trials will
deny accusations. The widespread use of trials may thus be seen as
both a response to the social legitimization of denial and also as a con-
tributor to it. We may not know which came first, the chicken of the
social reliance on trials or the egg of the social legitimization of denial,
but they may well go hand in hand.
Related to this is the subject of the public belief in the accuracy of
trials, for the "logic" that one only owes a moral debt if it can be shown
in court that one owes a legal debt rests on the belief that courts pro-
duce just results. Though in theory the social goal of holding wrongdo-
ers to account through trials and the private moral claim upon an
injurer to take responsibility need not be at cross-purposes, the belief
in the justness of the former may in part undermine the social demand
for the latter. The more confident society is that trials produce ac-
countability, the less it may press for private responsibility taking.
Please do not mistake my words above. I am not asserting a view
one way or another about whether our trials actually produce just out-
comes nor am I even claiming that there is a strong consensus within
175. For critiques of our cultural rights-orientation, see MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS
TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991); THE ESSENTIAL
COMMUNITARIAN READER (Amitai Etzioni ed., 1998).
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our society that our trial system is just. (Empirical data about public
perceptions of our court system shows mixed results.)176 Rather, the
hypothesis is that, to the extent it is accepted, the belief that trials
produce just outcomes may buttress the practice of denial.
A bit of legal history may be helpful here. The belief that "right
makes might" at trial-that the party in the right will prevail at
trial-has deep roots within our culture.177 Though we may now look
back with incredulity, such a belief was essential to the earliest forms
of trial within the Anglo system, namely, trials by ordeal and trials by
battle. In a trial by ordeal, as part of a church ceremony, the accused
might be made to grasp and hold a heated metal poker, thus burning
his hand.178 Justice was determined several days later by examining
how the wound had healed, the presumption being that an omniscient
God who would grant healing to the innocent but not to the guilty.
Closer to our current system was trial by battle, where it was believed
that God gave the party in the right, or their delegate, the strength to
prevail in physical combat.179 (The title "Esquire" we use for lawyers
derives from this tradition, for delegated combatants were often of the
sword-bearing squire class.18 0 As is still true, powerful organizations,
such as churches then and corporations today, could generally retain
the best esquires.) Within such trial mechanisms, denial was to some
extent legitimated for it was presumed the mechanism would produce
just results.
A second area for further investigation is what one might call the
linkage between the "microscopic" denial within ordinary legal dis-
putes and "macroscopic" denial, that is, the use of denial after mass
injury on a cultural level.
Though it is easy and unfortunately all too common to view our
national history through rose-colored glasses, it must be remembered
that our society was built in significant part upon the mass wrongs of
conquest and slavery. (Other uncompensated mass wrongs, for exam-
ple, concerning the subordination of women, exist in our nation's his-
tory as well, but for simplicity I will focus on these two.) Further, as
we think about these mass injuries, two features are of particular
note. First, the debt for these injuries essentially has never been paid.
Second, rather than being the place where redress was to be found,
176. See NAT'L CR. FOR ST. CTS., How THE PUBLIC VIEWS THE STATE COURTS: A 1999
NATIONAL SURVEY (1999); CAL. JUD. COUNCIL ADVISORY COMM. ON RACIAL AND
ETHNIC BIAS IN THE CTS., FAIRNESS IN THE CALIFORNIA STATE COURTS: A SURVEY
OF THE PUBLIC, ATTORNEYS AND COURT PERSONNEL (1994).
177. See Edward L. Rubin, Trial by Battle. Trial by Argument, 56 ARK. L. REV. 261
(2003).
178. THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNEIT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 114 (5th ed.
1956).
179. Id. at 115-16.
180. See OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) (sub verbo).
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the law was precisely the reverse-it was the final point of protection
for the injurer. Denial, in other words, was a central component of
these mass wrongs.
The lesson that it is acceptable to injure another without paying
compensation (the essential rationale of injurers in ordinary legal dis-
putes!) is nowhere clearer than in our nation's history. The North At-
lantic slave trade and subsequent institution of slavery, critical
building blocks in our nation's development, are among the greatest
human rights violations in human history, yet, in essence, restitution
has never been attempted.' 8l (Think, by contrast, of German Holo-
caust reparations.) Indeed, efforts to even discuss the subject of repa-
rations have largely been repressed. 8 2 So too the conquest of our
country over Native Americans represents a mass injury for which
restitution has never in essence been made.18 3 Though certainly not
the only nation so built, our nation was built in significant part
through what one might call a "denial mindset" which utilized sophis-
ticated ethnocentric and racist systems of thought to rationalize injury
without compensation. Upon reflection, this is not surprising. For a
structural injustice to persist across time, denial of the injustice is
usually a critical component, for were the injustice recognized, it
would be harder to maintain. Denial, in other words, is a common tool
those who benefit from a structurally unjust society use to maintain
that unjust society. To use the example of the Holocaust, the propa-
ganda machine run by Joseph Goebbels-perhaps history's most
proactive variant of denial-was essential in enabling the Nazis to
commit mass atrocities.
Returning to the American examples, observe that a key factor en-
abling such gross uncompensated wrongs was the law. Rather than
being a place of redress, the law served as the place of the ultimate
insulation from redress for the injurer.1S4 To call the law, which pur-
181. See, e.g., BORIS I. BITTKER, THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS (1973); RANDALL
ROBINSON, THE DEBT: WHAT AMERICA OwES BLACKS (2001); Graham Hughes,
Reparations for Blacks?, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1063 (1968); Robert Westley, Many
Billions Gone: Is It Time to Reconsider the Case for Black Reparations?, 40 B.C.
L. REV. 429 (1998). For discussions of reparations for historical injustices in a
variety of areas including, but not limited to, slavery, see WHEN SORRY ISN'T
ENOUGH: THE CONTROVERSY OVER APOLOGIES AND REPARATIONS FOR HUMAN IN-
JUSTICE (Roy L. Brooks ed., 1999) [hereinafter WHEN SORRY ISN'T GOOD ENOUGH].
182. ROBINSON, supra note 181, at 201.
183. See, e.g., Nell Jessup Newton, Compensation, Reparations, & Restitution: Indian
Property Claims in the United States, 28 GA. L. REV. 453 (1994); Laurence A.
French, Native American Reparations: Five Hundred Years and Counting, in
WHEN SORRY ISN'T ENOUGH, supra note 181, at 241; William Bradford, "With a
Very Great Blame on Our Hearts": Reparations, Reconciliation, and an American
Indian Plea for Peace with Justice, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1 (2002-2003).
184. In this regard, these macroscopic examples differ from the ordinary civil case of
injury where moral and legal responsibility overlap.
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ported to be a means toward justice, "fraudulent" would be an under-
statement. As Robert Williams writes, "The West's conquest of the
new world ... [albove all.., was a legal enterprise."18 5 "[The Western
legal system] vested superior rights of sovereignty over non-Western
indigenous peoples ... [and imposed] its vision of truth on non-West-
ern peoples through a racist, colonizing rule of law."18 6 The law, in
other words, formally protected the injurer's right to injure without
paying compensation. Even on those rare occasions where the injured
might theoretically have a legal basis for relief, the law in practice
removed that too.187 Rather than being a place of accountability, the
law was the means of denial.
Also of note is the role of lawyers in providing amoral, if not im-
moral, technical support. Now I do not mean to suggest that a lawyer
who helps a guilty-in-fact party in an ordinary civil case avoid liability
has moral culpability, if at all, anywhere near that of lawyers who
drafted and enforced slave codes. Common, however, to the macro and
micro settings is the technical approach of lawyers to their job.
Though espousing a profession rhetoric of dedication to the pursuit of
justice, in each case (though of course to different degrees), there is an
element of obliviousness to underlying morality in service of a techni-
cal legal system. A bit like the executioner of Paris, it did not matter
whom he was beheading, so long as the beheading was done prop-
erly.' 8 8 Note too that, throughout its history, our legal system has
been largely controlled by white men, the group principally benefitting
from the aforementioned mass wrongs. Though women and minori-
ties increasingly have entered the legal profession over the past de-
cades, the modalities of thought and operation established by white
men largely remain.18 9
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Let me make a few further comments. It is not my suggestion that,
for a culture to practice microscopic denial, historical patterns of mac-
roscopic denial like those just noted are necessary. Unpacking the
complex relationship between microscopic and macroscopic denial is
more than I can do here. It is my belief, however, that generally
speaking responsibility taking begets responsibility taking and denial
begets denial.190 Were we to practice greater responsibility taking in
one area (either macroscopic or microscopic), perhaps there would be
greater awareness about and impetus for practicing it in the other
area. Piercing the denial mindset may well have ripple effects. Con-
versely, our failure to practice denial in one area may ultimately prove
a barrier to our practicing it in others.
IV. CONCLUSION
Denying, rather than taking, responsibility after one injures an-
other is a basic act of moral regression. Our legal system, however,
helps mask that immoral act as normal. This is no small feat, and the
ramifications of what one might call the "pattern defect" of legal de-
nial are multifaceted. In terms of legal practice, lawyers should think
seriously about discussing responsibility taking with clients. Though
a client may benefit from denial economically, denial may harm the
client's moral, psychological, and relational interests. A lawyer should
not presume which factors the client values most, but rather learn the
skills of legal counseling needed to explore such matters with clients.
As a society, we should consider addressing structural factors that
may buttress the practice of denial we see in ordinary civil legal dis-
putes. Factors to consider include economic incentives within litiga-
tion, the nature of different dispute resolution mechanisms, the
methodology of legal education, and even broader aspects of our cul-
tural composition, such as rights-based ideology and social denials of
structural injustices.
In many respects, this Article is a scholarly work descriptively ana-
lyzing the above-mentioned matters. Yet this Article also contains a
basic prescriptive message about considering counseling responsibility
taking aimed more at practicing lawyers and law students (for they
soon will be practicing lawyers) than at scholars. It is in this latter
vein that I will conclude. Some practicing lawyers and law students
patient enough to have read this Article may respond with a variant of
the following: "This idea of counseling responsibility taking is a little
190. For a similar sentiment in religious vein, see SIDDUR SIM SHALOM 290 (Jules
Harlow ed., 1985) ("You cannot find redemption until you see the flaws in your
own soul, and try to efface them. Nor can a people be redeemed until it see the
flaws in its soul and tries to efface them. But whether it be an individual or a
people, whoever shuts out the realization of his flaws is shutting out
redemption.").
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'out there'. It's not what is commonly practiced. But perhaps you are
right. Maybe we lawyers should sometimes talk with clients about
taking responsibility? I don't really know." To such a person, I would
make a two-fold recommendation. First, when the time is right for
you, give it a try. On the day when you have a client who you think
might benefit from such a conversation and with whom you feel you
could have such a conversation, take the risk. Second, at some later
point, reflect on the experience.
